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RESPONSE TO STATEMENTS OF FACT IN 
THE UNIVERSITY'S BRIEF 
Certain mischaracterizations of the facts set forth in tae 
university's brief must be corrected before replying to arguments 
which are based on those facts. The remaining respondents have 
not seriously assailed any of t~e facts as originally described 
by the broker-dealers on these appeals. 
The University asserts in its brief (at 4-5) that, contrary to 
the broker-dealers' assertions, the broker-dealers recommended numer-
ous stocks to the University for purchase. What the University 
fails to state is that the transactions which the University asserts 
were "recommended" by the broker-dealers, whatever that term may 
* mean, constitute only a fraction of the hundreds of purchases and 
sales executed by the Universi,ty during the course of its investment 
program. (These four broker-dealers' opening brief, at 4). 
The University also devotes considerable time to questioning 
the origins and nature of the University's investment program as 
detailed in the broker-dealers' original brief. That discussion, 
however, begs the question: What is still uncontroverted is that the 
University made a threshold decision to adopt an investment program 
to place its non-interest bearing funds in securities. The para-
mount goal of that program, as copiously documented in the broker-
* The University relies on an affidavit filed by Donald Catron in 
support of its assertion that every stock purchased through Horn-
blower was "recommended" to him by that broker. The meaning of the 
term "recommended" as used by Mr. Catron is unclear and does not 
effectively controvert Hornblower's affidavit that it nonetheless 
acted only as an agent for the University on every single trans-
action in question. 
-1-
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dealers' original brief, was to depart from investments in fixed 
income securities to equities in the hope of relatively high long 
term return. The University does not controvert these facts. 
Similarly, while the University contends at some length that (11 
the Institutional Council did not discuss the January 20, 1972 reso-
lution at all before approving it and (2) some Council members 
criticized the program from an early date, neither of these asser-
tions is of any avail to the University. First of all, that the 
Council should have formally approved a resolution authorizing pur-
chases on margin without having discussed it first seems hardly to 
speak well for the level of fiduciary responsibility exercised by the 
Council on behalf of the University. second, this assertion makes 
the broker-dealers' point that University officials failed to exer-
cise any reasonable care before launching into this massive invest-
ment program. Third, it is still uncontroverted that the full 
Council was presented with regular reports on all phases of the 
investment program; that a few Council members were indeed critical 
of that program at various points has no legal relevance except to 
the extent it highlights the irresponsibility of the full Council's 
failure to re-evaluate that program or to seek the advice of the 
Attorney General regarding the legality of that program. This only 
further emphasizes that it was the full Council which was respon-
sible for monitoring, implementing, and approving the program as it 
was carried out. 
Two final points raised in the University's statement of facts 
merit treatment here. First, the University apparently concedes that 
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the Council never sought the advice of the Attorney General regarding 
the legality of the program, but attempts to shift the responsibility 
for that inquiry to the broker-dealers. However, as a matter of 
law (argued in these four broker-dealers' opening brief on appeal, at 
35 n.21), when the broker-dealers posed the express issues of the 
University's capacity and authority to purchase stock to the Insti-
tutional Council, by asking the Council for assurances of the Univer-
sity's power, they were relieved of any obligation they might other-
wise have had to make such inquiry. 
Second, the University devotes some discussion to the fact that 
officers of two Logan banks read a December 15, 1972 article in the 
Logan Herald-Journal which reported the Attorney General's tentative 
opinion that the University's investment program was illegal. This 
discussion is entirely pointless, as the University does not and 
cannot contend that any of those bank officers so advised the brokers, 
all of whom except one (Merrill Lynch, which by then had ceased deal-
ing with the University) had no offices in Utah, and none of whom 
had offices or agents in Logan. Indeed, it is uncontroverted that 
the broker-dealers did not know the University was acting unlawfully, 
assuming it was, in purchasing the securities at issue, nor were 
they aware of any fact which might have led them to believe the 
University's investments were unlawful.* 
* Merrill Lynch, R. 1433 (Stromberg Affidavit);. id. at 1422 
(Dunn Affidavit); Bear Stearns, R. 1998 (Cranston Affidavit); Vol. 
22, R. 1975 (Kaplan Affidavit for Hornblower); Sutro, R. 122 
(Juda Affidavit). 
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ARGUMENT 
PART ONE 
THE UNIVERSITY MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER 
AGAINST THESE BROKER-DEALERS, AND THE BROKER-
DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE 
A CLAIM SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
INTRODUCTION 
In its prefatory argument (University brief at 14-15), the 
University attempts to shift the issue presented here from the ques-
tion of relative liability as between the broker-dealers and the 
University to a focus on who should bear liability of loss as between 
the broker-dealers and the Utah taxpayers, who of course are not 
parties to this suit. The University understandably attempts to 
shift the issue because the taxpayers are innocent of any wrongdoing, 
and the policy issue thus posed would focus on who should bear the 
risk of loss as between two equally innocent parties, the taxpayers 
or the broker-dealers. In fact, however, it is not the taxpayers who 
seek recovery here, but the University, and as between that plaintiff 
and these broker-dealers, the only proper inquiry is indeed whether 
the University (and its responsible officers) should bear the risk of 
these losses after expressly warranting the propriety of these invest· 
ments to the broker-dealers, or whether instead the broker-dealers, 
their innocent agents, should bear those losses. 
This point deserves some treatment because the trial court also 
mischaracterized the issue presented in the same way as has the 
University. Both in its decisions denying the broker-dealers' first 
motions to dismiss and in its order granting the University's motions 
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for partial summary judgment, the trial court expressly noted that 
these transactions involve "monies placed [with Utah State Univer-
sity] by the taxpayers" and that there are "more than two parties 
interested in this matter • . • and that is the taxpayers whose money 
was used in these transactions and whose money was lost by reason of 
these transactions."* 
It is true that some yet-undefined portion of the funds invested 
by the University came from taxpayer monies as opposed to private 
donations, and Utah taxpayers have therefore suffered some indirect 
loss by reason of the University's investment program. This consti-
tutes no reason, however, for requiring these broker-dealers to 
shoulder the responsibility for the University's losses. It must 
be recalled that any time a private party prevails against a govern-
ment entity on a damages claim, it is the taxpayers who must ultimately 
shoulder that burden.** Sue~ cases demonstrate a salutary and well-
established judicial determination that such losses should be spread 
in small increments among a large population rather than forcing one 
innocent private party to indemnify all taxpayers against the mis-
conduct or excesses of authority of public officials. 
Indeed, this Court has recently taken occasion to expand at some 
length upon the proper allocation of loss in suits involving the 
government and private parties and has expressly announced that the 
government is in the future to be subject to broader fiscal respon-
sibility for its conduct and misconduct. In Standiford v. Salt Lake 
* Merrill Lynch, R. 396-97; Bear Stearns, R. 2185-86. 
** Such recovery is, of course, authorized by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1 to -34 (1978 & Supp. 1979). 
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City corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), Justice Stewart noted that 
the purpose of that decision was "to narrow governmental immunity" 
and that, as a result, it "should allow more innocent victims injured 
by tortious conduct on the part of public entities access to the 
courts for redress. Fewer such people will be mercilessly and 
senselessly barred from recovery for their injuries sustained at 
the hands of the entities designed to serve them." Id. at 1237. 
As in Standiford, the issue presented in these cases requires 
judicial determination of the best way to allocate loss between 
private individuals and government. In Standiford, the rule an-
nounced will have the effect of increasing expenditures of public 
funds to satisfy private claims. The Court need not go so far in 
these cases: all these brokers ask is that the Court adopt a paral-
lel policy (similarly allocating risk to the government rather than 
to the private party) which would preclude private parties from 
shouldering public losses in instances where the private party is 
guilty of no wrongdoing and where high government officers induced 
him to act on express warranties. A ruling against the brokers on 
these appeals would be diametrically inconsistent with the policy of 
government responsibility adopted in Standiford. 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS, THIS CASE IS 
NEITHER CONTROLLED NOR GUIDED BY THE HOLDING OF 
FIRST EQUITY. 
The University relies primarily upon the holding of First Equi_!y 
Corp. v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). The issue 
present in that case was the enforceability of an executory ultra 
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vires contract in the absence of any official warranty of the legal-
ity of the contract. Here, the issue is whether payments made in 
good faith pursuant to fully executed contracts and pursuant to 
official warranties of their legality, but later found to be ultra 
vires, can be recovered. While the University attempts to character-
ize this distinction as "relying ostrich-like on the technical mean-
ing of the language employed," Respondent's Brief at 34, it is in 
fact a distinction that many courts have found not only valid but 
fundamental. 
Even if the University had not assured the broker-dealers of the 
University's power to purchase the securities at issue, the Uni-
versity would still not be entitled to recover on executed contracts 
which were ultra vires. A paradigm case illustrating the distinction 
between executory and executed contracts of this kind is Tobin v. Town 
Council, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666 (1933). There, plaintiff was a 
contractor who had graded and gravelled several city streets under a 
written contract. After he had received approximately half the money 
due him under the contract, a new council repudiated the agreement, 
contending that it violated state statutes requiring ·~ompetitive 
bidding. The plaintiff sued to recover the balance due him, and the 
city counterclaimed for the money already paid, contending that as a 
matter of law, it must recover illegally spent tax funds. The par-
ties agreed that the work done could not be undone -- the city was to 
have the full benefit of plaintiff's labor. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed with the city that the balance 
still due on the contract could not be recovered. After determining 
that the contract had indeed been let in violation of the competitive 
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bidding statute, the court observed: 
Provisions of this kind must be so administered 
and construed as fairly and reasonably to accom-
plish their vitally important purpose. Only by 
sternly insisting upon positive obedience there-
to as mandatory provisions of law have the courts 
found that the policy they uphold may be main-
tained. We deem it unwise to relax this policy, 
concededly an extremely valuable safeguard to 
the taxpayers of the municipalities of this state. 
17 P.2d at 669. 
Therefore, the court held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff 
could not enforce the contract in question to recover the unpaid 
balance of the price. Id. That is the fact situation of First Equity, 
and the holding is precisely consistent. 
But the city's counterclaim to recover money already paid stood 
on quite a different- footing. The court said: 
The action presented by the counterclaim before 
us is essentially an action for money had and 
received. It is generally the case in such a 
proceeding that, in the absence of mistake, deceit, 
fraud, duress, oppression, or undue influence, the 
parties seeking to recover must be equitably en-
titled to a repayment of the money or no recovery 
can be had or repayment compelled •... 
The equitable principles thus governing the 
counterclaim at bar for the recovery of the money 
paid by the town have been applied as well to 
proceedings brought by municipal corporations as to 
those instituted by ordinary suitors. 
Id. at 674. 
The court further held that the improper expenditure of taxpayers' 
money was an insufficient equitable basis to compel the contractor 
to forfeit all compensation for the work he had performed. Id. at 678. 
The two branches of Tobin illustrate vividly the fallacy in 
plaintiff's contention that First Equity is controlling here. As 
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the first branch of Tobin holds, money owed under a void contract 
cannot be recovered. But as the second branch of Tobin holds, money 
already paid under such a contract cannot be recovered. First 
Equity is analogous to the first branch of Tobin, this case to the 
second. As Tobin shows, those critical factual distinctions yield 
different results. 
The same distinctions were present in Frederick v. Douglas 
County, 96 Wis. 411, 71 N.W. 798 (1897). There, the county had hired 
Grace, an attorney, to handle a substantial amount of tax litigation 
beyond the expertise of the county attorney, and had made partial 
payment for services rendered. This arrangement was eventually 
challenged by a taxpayer on the basis that the county had no statu-
tory authority to hire assistants for its attorney. The plaintiff 
taxpayer sought to have Grace return all the money that had been paid 
to him, and the trial court 'so ordered. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the contract with Grace 
was beyond the authority of the county to make, and that Grace there-
fore could not be paid for the balance of the services he had ren-
dered. However, the court denied any recovery of money already paid. 
The opinion, which merits quotation at some length, states: 
The evidence and the findings show that Mr. 
Grace's employment began in January, 1895, and 
it was a matter of public notoriety, and the plain-
tiff himself and presumably all taxpayers who kept 
track of the public proceedings knew that he was 
employed as early as the spring of 1895; that he 
performed large and valuable services, for which 
he was from time to time paid; and that not only 
he, but the county board, acted in entire good 
faith in the matter. • •• Mr. Grace's services 
ran through a number of months, and he undoubtedly 
has fully earned all the money which has been paid 
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him. During all this time the plaintiff and his 
fellow taxpayers remained silent, and allowed the 
services to be rendered and the money to be paid. 
They took no action until the latter part of 
November, 1895. Then they came into a court of 
equity, and asked for the stoppage of all payments 
in the future, and to this they are undoubtedly 
entitled. But he who comes into a court of equity 
must do equity. Could it, under any view of the 
circumstances, be said to be equitable to compel 
Mr. Grace to pay back the money which he received 
for long and valuable labors, rendered honestly and 
in good faith, the benefit of which the corporation 
has received, and concerning which the taxpayers 
••• were, or ought to have been, fully informed 
during their entire progress? Were a court of 
equity to make this judgment under the circumstances, 
we should regard it as having become an engine of 
oppression, rather than an instrument of justice. 
We do not rest this decision entirely upon the 
ground that the remedy has been lost by laches, or 
that the county has become estopped, but upon the 
ground that under all the circumstances, the plain-
tiff having invoked the relief of a court of equity, 
that court, in granting the relief, will not take 
away the fruit of honest labor. 
71 N.W. at 802-03 (emphasis added). 
In State v. Fronizer, 77 Ohio St. 7, 82 N.E. 518 (1907), the 
state sought to recover partial payments made to a bridge builder. 
It was undisputed that the bridges in question were built and repair-
ed in workmanlike fashion, acceptable to the county on whose behalf 
the state was bringing suit. However, the contracts involved were 
void because the county auditor had not certified that sufficient 
funds were available, as required by law. The court, incisively charac· 
terizing the contracts in question as "void [but not] tainted," held: 
This court is of opinion that such recovery is not 
authorized. The principle applicable to the situa-
tion is the equitable one that where one has ac-
quired possession of the property of another through 
an unauthorized and void contract, and has paid for 
the same, there can be no recovery back of the 
money paid without putting, or showing readiness to 
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put, the other party in statu quo, and that rule 
controls this case unless such recovery is plainly 
authorized by the statute. The rule rests upon 
that principle of common honesty that imposes an 
obligation to do justice upon all persons, natural 
as well as artificial, and is recognized in many 
cases. 
82 N.E. at 520-21 (emphasis added). 
In Village of Pillager v. Hewitt, 98 Minn. 265, 107 N.W. 815 
(1906), the city sought to recover payments made to a bridge builder 
under a void contract. City officials had inspected and accepted the 
bridge, but had refused to pay the balance due on the ground that 
contract was void. In holding that the city could not recover pay-
ments made pursuant to a void contract, the court stated, 
It may be conceded that the defendant could not 
have maintained an action on the contract to re-
cover the contract price for the bridge, although 
he had fully performed the contract on his part; 
for upon the grounds of sound public policy the doc-
trine of ultra vires is applied with greater strict-
ness to municipal than to private corporations. 
This, however, is an'action, in the nature of an 
action for money had and received, which is based 
upon equitable principles, to recover back the 
consideration paid by the plaintiff to the defend-
ant for building a bridge which was accepted by it, 
and which fully complied with the terms of the 
contract. The fact that the bridge was afterwards 
carried away by a flood is not material, for it was 
not due to any fault of the defendant or any one 
else. . • • The defendant in good faith received 
the money and bonds in payment of the bridge which 
he had built for the plaintiff. The consideration 
for such payment was full and fair, and, in equity 
and good conscience, it ought to have been made by 
the plaintiff. Such being the case, it would be 
most inequitable and unconscionable to compel the 
defendant to return the money and bonds paid to him 
. . • and we hold that the plaintiff cannot maintain 
this action to recover them. 
107 N.W. at 816. 
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The same doctrine was squarely recognized by this court in 
Moe v. Millard County School Dist., 54 Utah 144, 179 P. 980 (1919). 
There, the school district resisted paying a balance due on a con-
tract for the installation of heating, plumbing, and ventilating 
fixtures on the basis that the district had exceeded its constitu-
tional debt limit, but it wanted to retain the fixtures in question. 
The plaintiff contractor sought to remove them, and offered to return 
the money he had already been paid if he were allowed to do so. This 
court, invoking the equitable doctrines previously discussed, held: 
We cannot perceive the necessity of refunding the 
money that was paid as aforesaid. To that extent 
the contract has been executed, and there cer-
tainly is no good reason why in equity that matter 
should be reopened. Nor is it necessary to do 
that in order to reflect justice between the par-
ties •••. The only question therefore is: To 
what extent shall plaintiff be permitted to re-
move his property? In our judgment he should only 
be permitted to remove so much thereof in value as 
has not been paid for and no more. 
Id. at 151-52, 179 P. at 983. While the relief sought by the parties 
in Moe was somewhat different .than that sought in the cases from 
other jurisdictions, the result was identical equity allowed the 
party that had performed to retain the fruits of his labors. 
The efforts made to distinguish the Moe case have been uncon-
vincing. In a memorandum decision, Judge Christoffersen tried to 
distinguish the case in the proceedings below by saying: 
[D]efendants here argue that because Moe was not 
required to return the partial payment this is 
authority that Utah State cannot recover payments 
made to the brokers on commissions or other losses. 
However, this would be a case where the school 
would enjoy the benefits of the plumbing and heat-
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ing materials installed plus a return of their 
partial payment which is not the case here. The 
University does not seek to return the stocks and 
receive back their payments for the same . • • . 
University's Brief at 39. This statement may be literally true, but 
is somewhat misleading, in that it implies that the University has 
offered to return the stocks. To the contrary, the University 
liquidated them. Surely, distinguishing between the retention of the 
specific benefits conferred (i.e., receipt of securities and the 
opportunity for gain or risk of loss) and the retention of those 
benefits in another form (i.e., money after liquidating the securi-
ties) is legally meaningless. 
The University asserts that Moe is distinguishable because, as 
the court noted, the school district could at a later time have 
entered into a valid contract with the plaintiff. It is clear, 
however, that that remark was nothing more than a suggestion on how 
the school district might avoid the waste it claimed would result 
from removal of the fixtures. Id. at 150, 179 P. at 983. It is 
plain that the capacity of parties to enter into a second contract 
has no effect on the legal validity of the first. It is submitted 
that the trial court and the University cannot properly distinguish 
Moe from the present case. They have told us how it is different (in 
effect, only that plumbing equipment is different than securities), 
but they have stated no reasons whatsoever why the factual distinc-
tions between this case and Moe ought to lead to a different outcome. 
The important distinction, which the University attempts to 
belittle, is between these related appeals and First Equity. It is 
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simply this: While the law may occasionally require a harsh and 
unjust result (and the University concedes at page 73 of its brief 
that the result in First Equity was harsh), equity will not sanction 
it. The law may prevent the prospective enforcement of a contract 
entered into in good faith, but equity will not allow a public entity 
to stand idly by, reap the benefits of another's labor, and then rob 
him retroactively of his just compensation. First Equity was con-
trolled by and decided under a law harsh in its application. This 
case presents an appeal to equity and conscience. In dismissing that 
distinction as meaningless and technical the University asks this 
Court to ignore the very existence and purpose of equity jurisprudence. 
POINT II 
MONEY RECEIVED FOR SERVICES RENDERED UNDER A GOOD 
FAITH CONTRACT CANNOT BE RECOVERED WHILE RETAINING 
THE BENEFITS OF THOSE SERVICES. 
Throughout its brief the University has asserted that "public 
monies expended pursuant to unlawful contracts may be recovered" 
(~,at 24). It has cited a myriad of cases (most of which are 
simply string citations) which assertedly agree with that proposi-
tion, perhaps hoping that by the sheer weight of this "authority" it 
may convince this Court to abandon any notions of fair play in resolv-
ing these cases. While replete with citations, the University's 
brief is short on convincing authority, and for good reason. Aside 
from occasional bits of dicta or obiter dicta, the cited cases, with 
few exceptions, simply fail to support the University's position. 
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Because of the bulk of the University's citations, the broker-
dealers will not distinguish each of those cases at this point. 
Rather, we invite the attention of the Court to Appendix "A" of this 
brief, which is devoted in its entirety to an analysis of the facts 
and holdings of each of the cases cited by the University from pages 
24 through 32 of its brief, and which demonstrates cumulatively that 
those cases are no authority for the University's position. 
In addition to its "authority" for the proposition that public 
bodies may also recover ultra vires payments, distinguished in the 
Appendix to this brief, the University has made several other asser-
tions subsumed within that general topic which bear response here: 
(1) the University erroneously contends that the brokers have con-
ceded that they owe commissions to the. University; (2) the University 
appears to posit much of its argument on the unfounded claim that the 
courts treat "illegal" contracts differently than "ultra vires" con-
tracts; (3) the University claims that the general rule prohibiting 
recovery on illegal contracts is not applicable to public entities 
and that public bodies are exempt from the general principle that 
payments made under mistake of law cannot be recovered. Each of 
these assertions will be treated in turn. 
1. The University May Not Recover Commission Payments. 
The broker-dealers have never conceded that they are liable to 
the University for commissions which they received. Precedents 
abound which declare that a party making voluntary payments under 
mistake of law, including commission payments, may not recover.* 
* ~. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U.S. 541, 543-44 
(1878); City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 
731 (1866). 
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Mistaken payments to brokers are no exception to this rule. 
In Buschbaum v. Barron, 1 N.J. Super. 4, 61 A.2d 512 (N.J. 
super. ct. App. Div. 1948), plaintiff sued to recover a commission 
already paid to a broker, on the ground that under New Jersey law 
the broker was not entitled to a commission from that particular 
transaction. The court denied relief, holding that 
[g]enerally, the one who has made the payment 
[in an illegal bargain] is not entitled to 
restitution. The entire transaction had been 
executed. Plaintiff received from defendant 
full performance and paid only what he promised 
to pay. Plaintiff showed no basis for relief. 
* 61 A.2d at 513. 
Similarly, in Richardson v. Roberts, 210 Cal. App. 2d 603, 26 
Cal. Rptr. 829 (Dis. Ct. App. 1962), a real estate broker sued to 
recover portions of his commissions which he had voluntarily paid to 
the defendant as consideration for obtaining loans for the broker's 
clients. The plaintiff argued that these payments were illegal 
since the defendant was not properly licensed. The court agreed 
that the payments were unlawful, but held for the defendant, reason-
ing as follows: "In the case at bar the contract is fully executed 
and there is no valid claim that defendant's performance was in any 
way deficient •• 'There is no equitable reason for invoking 
restitution when the plaintiff gets the exchange which he expected.'" 
26 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (citations omitted). The University has not 
alleged that the broker-dealers' performance was in any way defi-
cient. The University has not alleged that it got from the exchange 
anything other than what it expected. Therefore, there is no reason 
* Accord, Messner v. Union County, 34 N.J. 233, 167 A.2d 897, 
898 (1901).'" 
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for it to invoke restitution. Indeed, equity cries for a contrary 
result. 
when the United States Supreme Court faced a case involving a 
broker and an already executed contract which the petitioning foreign 
corporation could not legally carry out, the Court declared: 
The respondent [broker] is not to be deprived of 
his compensation simply because petitioner found 
itself unable to consummate the latter contract 
by reason of its inability to perform a condition 
made necessary by the provisions of the law of 
another country. 
Even if the contract of sale was void by 
British law, all other questions aside, respond-
ent's connection with it was not such as to 
deprive him of his commission. 
Gaston, Williams & Wigmore v. Warner, 260 U.S. 202, 204, 67 L.Ed. 
210, 213 (1922). 
The broker-dealers are similarly situated. Their principal, 
the University, claims that its transactions are void. If that 
contention is accurate, the.case just cited compels the conclusion 
that the broker-dealers are entitled to their compensation regard-
less. 
Furthermore, the University is not entitled to recover commis-
sions from these broker-dealers because they reasonably and in good 
faith changed their position in reliance upon the regularity of the 
transactions here at issue. On hundreds of occasions, the broker-
dealers received payment and commissions from the University for its 
purchases. The broker-dealers passed on the purchase price of each 
security to the sellers, retaining only their commissions as their 
benefit of the bargain. Those commission payments were then paid out 
through the ordinary course of business to satisfy their regular 
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expenses. In so doing, the broker-dealers reasonably and in good 
faith changed their position in reliance upon the regularity of these 
transactions, and the University may not now recover monies delivered 
to the broker-dealers which have long since been dispersed. 
In a case cited by the University in support of its position, 
~aricopa County v. Cities & Towns of Avondale, 12 Ariz. App. 109, 467 
P.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1970), the court denied recovery to the public 
entity of funds paid out through a mistake of law, since the defend-
ant had changed its position in reliance upon the regularity of the 
transactions there at issue. After noting the "general rule" that 
public bodies may recover funds mistakenly paid out, the court stated, 
No claimant, however, has an absolute right to 
restitution for an enriching benefit, mistakenly 
conferred. Comment c under § 1 of the Restatement 
of Restitution states: 
"Even where a person has received the 
benefit from another, he is liable to pay 
therefor only if the circumstances of its 
receipt or retention are such that, as be-
tween the two persons, it is unjust for him 
to retain it." 
467 P.2d at 953. 
2. There Is No Meaningful Distinction Between "Ultra Vires" 
and "Illegal" Contracts. 
The University further contends (at 35-36) that there exists 
some distinction in the law between "ultra vires" and "illegal" con-
tracts, so that the general rule denying recovery on illegal con-
tracts is not a rule applicable to ultra vires contracts. The Uni-
versity cites no authority in support of this impossible semantic 
distinction, as indeed no such authority exists. As the term "ultra 
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vires" literally means "outside the law," there certainly can be no 
distinction between ultra vires and illegal contracts. 
3. The General Rule Prohibiting Recovery on Illegal Contract 
Payments Made Under Mistake of Law Applies to Public Entities. 
The University then asserts, however, that the general rules 
prohibiting recovery on illegal contracts are not applicable to public 
bodies (at 36-37). Similarly, the University asserts that public 
bodies are not subject to the general rule that payments under mis-
take of law are not recoverable. We will respond to those assertions 
as one, as there is no logical reason to distinguish between them: 
The older cases supporting these propositions are simply further 
examples of the "special treatment" sometimes historically accorded 
to the government for reasons which are increasingly being discarded 
by the courts. 
As is true of the trad~tional notion that the government could 
not be estopped, or principles denying recovery against the state 
because of sovereign immunity, all "special treatment" of the govern-
ment which forces private parties to bear the risk of government 
misconduct are in the process of being reversed, at least where the 
government acts (as it has here) in a clearly proprietary capacity. 
Under such circumstances, a public party will be subject to the same 
rules of equity and fairness as a similarly situated private party. 
For this same reason, the broker-dealers also should not be liable to 
the University for payments which they received, since the University 
made those payments in a proprietary capacity, and it should there-
fore be subject to the same rules of contract as were enunciated in 
the cases cited above on that issue. 
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The broker-dealers argued at some length in their opening brief 
that the University should not be allowed to recover on executed 
contracts even if they are ultra vires, and that ultra vires payments 
made under mistake of law cannot be recovered. Appellants' Brief 
at 41-45. Those authorities have not been refuted by the University 
and will not be reiterated. One of those assertions, however, bears 
mention because it has not been controverted at all: Like the United 
States, the State of Utah is subject to the commercial law applicable 
to contracts between private individuals when it engages in commer-
cial activity. It matters not whether the contracting party is the 
federal government, a state, a municipality, or a private citizen. 
Appellants' Brief at 45. 
A ruling for the broker-dealers on these appeals expressly adopt-
ing that principle would be the only result consistent with this 
court's recent ruling in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980), which held that henceforth governmental entities in 
Utah will be subjected to a higher standard of responsibility for 
their own misconduct.* 
The broker-dealers respectfully urge this Court to adopt a 
principle of sovereign responsibility in these cases which would hold 
the government responsible for its own conduct when acting in a pro-
prietary or rather non-governmental capacity (as that term was re-
cently defined in Standiford). In all such instances, the government 
* The court there held that it would abandon the traditional 
sovereign-proprietary distinction in resolving the question of 
government immunity, a result which recognizes that "a governmental 
entity, like individuals and private entities, should be liable for 
an injury inflicted by it." 605 P.2d at 1234. As this court there 
recognized; the doctrine of sovereign immunity "was itself largely 
unsound:" Id. Similarly, related doctrines which afford special 
pr~tection to the sovereign, including all of those upon which the 
University here relies, are equally unsound, and for the same reasons. 
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should then be responsible for its own torts and likewise should be 
precluded from shifting liability for losses onto innocent private 
parties. Such a ruling would be consistent with law already announ-
ced by other courts. 
For example, in Hunke v. Foote, 84 Id. 391, 373 P.2d 322 (1962), 
the Idaho Supreme Court held a municipality subject to the same rules 
applicable to private parties because the government was acting in a 
proprietary capacity, explaining that: 
When operating in its proprietary capacity a 
municipal corporation is subject to the same 
burdens, responsibilities and liabilities as a 
private corporation or individual acting in the 
same capacity. 
373 P.2d at 323. And in City of High Point v. Duke Power Co., 120 
F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1941), the court held that the city could not 
recover amounts paid for electrical power in excess of its legal 
liability, explaining: 
And it has been held, and quite properly we think, 
that even in jurisdictions where a municipal cor-
poration is permitted to recover voluntary payments, 
the rule will not be applied in c.ase of payments 
made in its private and proprietary capacity. 
Id. at 869. 
Perhaps the clearest expression of the policy issues raised 
here and of the University's position on those issues is provided 
by the University itself in its conclusion to the first two parts 
of its brief on appeal (at 73-74). The University there asserts 
the "rudimentary principle of jurisprudence" that women and minors 
are properly treated differently by the law than are men, a distinc-
tion which the University claims is the result of the law's recog-
nition "that policy considerations justify different treatment." 
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First of all, we are constrained to respond that the law will no 
* longer sanction different treatment of women and men, an evolution in 
the law of which the Attorney General's office is apparently unaware. 
This transition in the law recognizes that its traditional treatment 
of women as being under a legal incapacity, and therefore deserving of 
special treatment, was based on unsound assumptions. 
Most courts have likewise realized that special treatment of the 
government is premised on the unsound assumption that the government 
was to be given the benefit of a similar presumption of limited capa-
city. It is true that minors are still given some "special" protec-
tion by the law, because they are indeed under some legal incapacity 
but no similar inference should operate in favor of a governmental 
body whose chief officers and governing board are sophisticated and 
knowledgeable businessmen used to corporate affairs and managing 
investments.** 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL DOES APPLY TO THE UNIVER-
SITY. THE COURT BELOW THEREFORE ERRED IN GRANTING 
THE UNIVERSITY'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING THE BROKER-DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS. 
The University relies on dicta in First Equity Corp. v. Utah 
State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975) that estoppel will not 
apply to a governmental entity because of acts of its "agents or 
officers in excess of their statutory or constitutional powers." Id. 
* 
~, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. 
§2000e (1976) Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1974 & Supp. 1979) 
(comparable to Title VII) • 
** The sophistication of the officers and Council members is a 
matter set forth at some length in Appendix A to the broker-dealers' 
original brief on appeal. 
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at 892 (quoting 15 C.J.S. 540). The issue of estoppel was not prop-
erly before the court in First Equity because there was no Insti-
tutional Council resolution in that record which represented the 
power of the University to purchase securities, as there is in the 
instant cases. 
The Officers and Institutional Council Members of the Univer-
sity had Authority to Issue Warranties of the University's Capacity 
and to Direct the University's Investment Program. 
The issue of the authority or lack of authority of the Univer-
sity's governing agents to approve and supervise the investment pro-
gram is extremely important here. The importance of any ruling on 
that issue can be highlighted by the following simple analyses. 
First, as to the primary actions, the University's sole basis 
for recovery is that: 
1. The purchases and' sales at issue here were made pursuant to 
ultra vires contracts with each broker-dealer. 
2. The University is not estopped to recover from the broker-
dealers because, in authorizing those investments, the officers and 
Council members exceeded their statutory authority. 
3. Therefore, the university is entitled to recover against 
the broker-dealers. 
Conversely, in the third party actions, the broker-dealers have 
alleged that: 
1. If the university recovers in the primary actions, it will 
be only because the subject transactions were ultra vires and because 
the officers and Council members exceeded their authority. 
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2. If the officers and Council members exceeded their author-
ity, they must be held personally liable on those contracts on theo-
ries of express warranty, indemnity and contribution. 
3. Therefore, if the University recovers in the principal 
actions, the broker-dealers must be allowed to proceed with the third 
party actions. 
Finally, once again highlighting the importance of this question 
of authority, the primary defense of the third party defendants, and 
the primary basis for the trial court's dismissal of the third party 
actions, can be reduced to the following summary: 
l. The officers and Council members had general statutory 
authority to supervise and approve all University investments. 
2. In authorizing and approving the subject transactions, the 
third party defendants were acting within the scope of that author-
ity. 
3. The third party actions must be dismissed because offi-
* cers acting within their authority are immune from suit. 
The trial court never ruled on the question of the authority 
of the officers and Council members to authorize and approve the 
investment program, but it apparently believed that the officers did 
exceed their authority since its ruling in the primary action is 
* The third party defendants also assert that the broker-dealers' 
claims for indemnity and contribution are without merit, but they are 
compelled to rely on facts outside the pleadings to begin to attempt 
to assert those arguments, and because the orders dismissing the 
third party action were based upon Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, all allegations of the third party complaints 
must be deemed to be true (a principle they have conceded in the 
opening portion of their brief), so reference to facts outside the 
pleadings is improper and cannot avail them. 
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based upon a finding that the subject transactions were ultra vires. 
As a matter of law and equity, however, it should have been impossible 
for the trial court simultaneously to allow recovery to the Univer-
sity on the principal actions while denying recovery to the broker-
dealers on the third party actions. Those results are diametrically 
and irreducibly inconsistent, because the trial court indicated that 
the primary basis for its ruling on the third party actions was that 
the third party defendants enjoy the protection of official immunity. 
Clearly, even as that theory is argued by the third party defendants, 
they are not entitled to such immunity if they did indeed exceed 
their statutory authority. The inconsistency of these rulings is 
perhaps best clarified by resort to one final summary: 
1. If the officers and members were without statutory author-
ity to approve the subject transactions, they may not invoke the 
defense of official immunity (by their own admission), and the third 
party actions should not have been dismissed. 
2. If the officers and members acted within their general 
authority, then the doctrine of estoppel a~ repeatedly applied by 
this Court must preclude recovery against the broker-dealers by the 
University. This point is the subject of the next part of this 
argument. 
Before turning to an extended discussion of the application of 
estoppel in these cases, the broker-dealers would also like to sug-
gest that as a matter of sound judicial policy the traditional dis-
tinctions between "excesses of authority" and acts in "excess of 
jurisdiction" are as fundamentally unsatisfactory in actual appli-
cation as the traditional "distinctions" between governmental and 
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proprietary action which were recently abandoned by this court in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
careful review of the dozens of cases involving resolution of that 
question (in estoppel cases and in cases discussing the scope of 
official immunity) reveals that, in actuality, those doctrines have 
been invoked by the courts in order to justify an equitable result. 
What finally mattered in each case was the totality of equities 
on each side, including weighing of the relative interests of the 
governmental party, the private party, and the degree of adverse 
effect on the interests of the public of any given ruling. In any 
case where ruling for a private party would not result in serious 
detriment to the interests of the government or the public, the 
courts have found that officers were acting generally "within their 
authority" and therefore estopped the government from recovery (in 
those cases where the courts discussed that question at all). 
Similarly, where the public interests would not suffer serious 
detriment and the private party had been genuinely injured by govern-
ment action, the courts have found that the complained of conduct of 
defendant officers "exceeded their authority," and therefore denied 
official immunity to the defendant officers. A review of Utah cases 
on this subject alone (within discussions of estoppel and of official 
immunity) highlights the unsatisfactory nature of continuing lip 
service to the phrase "excess of authority." 
The broker-dealers respectfully submit that a more appropriate 
approach to the question of authority in cases invoking either estop-
pel of the government or official immunity would simply be to weigh 
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the facts and equities present in each case, to review the degree of 
harm suffered by a private party in reliance on government conduct 
against the degree of harm to the public in precluding recovery by 
the government, and to base each ruling on those facts and policy 
considerations alone. In this era of increasing assumption of re-
sponsibility by government for its conduct, and of decreasing govern-
mental inununity as a shield to government misconduct, such an approach 
would seem to be mandated. 
We hasten to add, however, that while the broker-dealers should 
certainly prevail under such an alternate approach, they are also 
entitled to prevail under principles clearly establi~hed in existing 
law. It is that existing law upon which the remaining arguments in 
this brief and in the broker-dealers' original brief are based. 
A Recent Decision by this Court Compels Estoppel of the Univer-
sity in These Cases. 
This court recently held that it will apply equitable estoppel 
to governmental entities. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Con-
trol Conunission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). In that case plaintiff 
wished to open a private club where liquor would be sold and 
inquired whether the premises he had in mind would comply with a 
Utah statute prohibiting the location of private clubs within 600 
feet of schools and other designated places. The Utah State Liquor 
Commission issued a letter to plaintiff which advised him that the 
location in question did not violate that statute, but after plain-
tiff had acted in reliance upon that letter the Conunission advised 
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him that he would violate the statute if liquor were sold on the 
premises. Accordingly, the Commission refused to issue plaintiff a 
liquor license. 
The court held that the Commission was estopped to deny plain-
tiff a liquor license, even though it apparently was acting in a 
governmental rather than a non-governmental capacity, because all the 
elements of estoppel were present. Id. at 690. Those elements were: 
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allow-
ing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such admission, statement, or act. 
Id. at 694 (footnote omitted). 
The uncontroverted facts here relating to the resolutions issued 
by the Institutional Council to the broker-dealers provide greater 
reason for applying estoppel than did the facts in Celebrity Club. 
Here, the governmental entity, the University, was clearly not act-
ing in a governmental capacity. Its commercial activity in compet-
ing with other buyers and sellers in the interstate securities markets 
to obtain financial gain, could hardly be more proprietary. Accord-
ingly, application of estoppel here does not give rise to the concerns 
addressed by this court and others in instances where the government 
is performing purely a governmental function. 
Each of the elements of estoppel, as set out in Celebrity Club, 
is present here: 
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1. The resolutions of the Institutional Council were "admis-
sions" or "statements" representing that the University had power to 
purchase the securities at issue and the University by these lawsuits 
has asserted claims which are inconsistent with that affirmative 
representations. 
2. Each broker-dealer acted in reliance on "such admission, 
statement, or act." 
3. Each broker-dealer will be injured by allowing the Univer-
sity "to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act" 
and thereby recover judgment in these cases. 
In addition, the public officials here were acting within their 
authority to the same extent as was the Liquor Commission in 
Celebrity Club. There the Commission had authority to license clubs 
located more than 600 feet from certain places, but it lacked author-
ity to authorize clubs to locate within that radius. Even so, the 
Court in Celebrity Club estopped the Commission from denying a license 
on the basis of a survey which showed plaintiff's club to be less 
than 600 feet from a school. In other words, the Commission was 
estopped even though it lacked authority to license clubs located 
within 600 feet of schools, and such approval would certainly have 
been ultra vires. 
Similarly, in this action, the University officials had author-
ity to make investments on the University's behalf in securities 
generally, although this Court held in First Equity that it had 
authority to purchase some types of securities and not others. While 
the University may not have authority to purchase the specific types 
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of securities at issue, it was within the general authority of the 
Institutional Council and officers to address questions relating to 
the University's investment powers and to direct some investments.* 
It should also be remembered that there is no statute specifi-
cally prohibiting the University from investing in the securities at 
issue, and at the time the investments were made there was no opinion 
of any court in Utah stating that the investments were unlawful. (By 
contrast, in Celebrity Club there existed a clear statutory prohibi-
tion on the conduct in question there). It was not until this 
Court's decision in December 1975, well after the events at issue 
here had occurred, that there had been some official declaration on 
the legality of these investments. 
It should also be pointed out that the Institutional Council had 
knowledge of the pertinent facts. They knew they wished to purchase 
equity securities and that the broker-dealers through whom they wished 
to deal had a question about the University's legal power to do so. 
That members of the Institutional Council may not have been aware of 
the state of the law is not material, particularly when at the time 
the state of the law was ambiguous. In this connection, it is parti-
cularly inexcusable for the Institutional Council to have rested on 
its ignorance when the broker-dealers had raised that question, and 
when they had represented the lawfulness of the transactions to the 
broker-dealers. They necessarily implied to the broker-dealers that 
they knew the transactions were lawful, when apparently they did not 
know. 
The third-party defendant officers and Council members so argue 
at length in their brief (at 8, 10-15). 
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In its brief the University attempts to undermine the broker-
dealers' defense of estoppel by contending for the first time that 
two broker-dealers, Hornblower and Bear Stearns, did not receive 
copies of the resolution. Though the record is uncontroverted that 
* both broker-dealers received such a resolution and relied on it, 
one page of the two page resolution was missing from the record on 
appeal in one file and both pages of the resolution were missing from 
the record in the other case. After filing its brief the University 
stipulated to supplementing the record on appeal with the missing 
copies, and the Court entered an order on October 9, 1979, directing 
the clerk to insert those documents into the record. Other copies 
of the same resolution were before the court below, and no one con-
tended below that copies of the resolution had not gone to all the 
broker-dealers. 
The University als~ attempts to challenge the uncontroverted 
sworn statements in the record that each broker-dealer relied on the 
resolution or resolutions it received. Broker-dealers' opening brief 
at 19 and references thereat to the record. The University argues 
that in some cases the resolutions were received after the broker-
dealer had commenced to deal with the University. The University did 
not raise this argument below, and had it done so the broker-dealers 
would have supplied facts of the industry practice of obtaining oral 
assurance from a private or public corporation or customer that 
appropriate authority and capacity were present and that a resolution 
* 
Bear Stearns, R. 1998 (Cranston Affidavit); Vol. 22, R. 1975 
(Kaplan Affidavit for Hornblower). 
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to that effect would be forthcoming. These resolutions generally are 
delayed because corporate boards or governing bodies generally meet 
only periodically, and it is not uncommon for a month or more to pass 
before a written document is received. As in the banking industry, 
the securities industry necessarily relies on the good faith of 
others through oral assurances in order to take commercial action 
immediately in markets that fluctuate daily. Furthermore, as the 
University did not raise this argument in the Court below, and never 
controverted in those proceedings the broker-dealers' reiterated 
assertions of reliance on the written resolutions, it has waived that 
* objection. 
In conclusion, Utah law unequivocally supports the propriety of 
estopping the University from recovery here. Utah is consistent with 
** the majority of courts in so holding. The trial court's award of 
partial summary judgment on liability issues to the University should 
therefore be reversed. 
* As this court stated in First Equity, supra, 544 P.2d at 892 n.5: 
"ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise a theory on appeal for the 
first time different from that presented to the Court below." Accord, 
Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145, 148 (Utah 1978) ("this final issue was 
not properly raised below and we may not consider it here for the 
first time •••• ") 
** The University contends, of course, that this is untrue (at 44-
45), by inaccurately characterizing Professor Davis' recent trea-
tise discussion of that subject. Once again we must point out that 
Davis' most recent commentary on this subject concludes: 
The law has changed. The Treatise of 1958 said that 
"the courts usually hold that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel does not apply to the government." That state-
ment was based on many cases • • . • The opposite 
statement now has almost uniform support of decisions 
of the 1970s: The doctrine of equitable estoppel does 
apply to the government. 
K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, §17.01 at 399 (1976) 
emphasis supplied. 
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POINT IV 
THE BROKER-DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM SHOULD PROPERLY BE GRANTED BY 
THIS COURT. 
By leave of court granted during oral argument on April 19, 
1978, defendants refiled motions to dismiss the University's corn-
-ma.~!& 
plaints on or about 2\if!£1 1 rn, 1978 pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was filed with the court 
following the filing of all affidavits now in the record and the 
taking of all depositions. The court thus had before it all the 
facts which are now in the record before it ruled. Rule 12(b) pro-
vides in part: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered 
(6) to dismiss for failure of a pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and dis-
posed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such motion by 
Rule 56. 
The court did not exclude any matters outside the pleading in deny-
ing the motion. Accordingly this court is entitled to review the 
uncontroverted facts in the record in reviewing the lower court's 
denial of the broker-dealers' Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss. 
The University incorrectly argues beginning at page 67 of its 
brief that the lower court's denial of the motions to dismiss should 
be affirmed because there exist material issues of fact but only in 
connection with the broker-dealers' estoppel defense. It does not 
claim there are any controverted facts relating to the broker-
dealers' defense that they are entitled to prevail because monies 
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paid pursuant to unlawful contracts may not be recovered. 
The University asserts various "issues of fact" and allegations 
of broker culpability which should allegedly negate their estoppel 
defenses and thus preclude this court from entering judgment in favor 
of the broker-dealers pursuant to their motions to dismiss. Those 
contentions are without merit for several reasons. 
The University alleges that the broker-dealers violated broker 
association rules requiring that all brokers "know their customers" 
and that they reconunend only those investments which are "suitable" 
for each customer (in its brief at 48-49). It will be recalled that 
the University asserted the same wrongdoing in its original federal 
court actions, which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of 
with the conunent that "USU seeks to take advantage of its own wrong-
ful acts" and that an "ultra vires act of an institutional customer 
may not be converted into a wrongful act of a broker. "* Furthermore, 
the simple response to the University's allegations is that the 
broker-dealers did fulfill their responsibilities under those rules, 
when they sought and obtained from the Institutional Council the 
written warranties of capacity and authority which expressly authc-
rized them to enter into each of the subject transactions with the 
University's designated agents. 
The University next contends that there are "issues of fact" 
which would preclude ruling in the broker-dealers' favor on their 
motions to dismiss. No such issues of fact were ever raised by the 
University below, and therefore have been waived. 
Utah State Univ. of Agric. and Applied Science v. Bear, Stear~ 
&Co., 549F.2dl64, 168 (10th Cir. 1977). 
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Those manufactured "issues of fact" are: 
(1) that Bear Stearns and Hornblower never received a 
resolution from the University. We have shown at p. 
31, supra, that it is uncontroverted that they did. 
(2) that because a few transactions were apparently 
executed on behalf of the University before copies of 
resolutions were received by some of the broker-
dealers that there is no reliance. We responded to 
this at pp. 31 & 32, supra. 
(3) That there is an issue whether broker-dealers' 
knew of newspaper articles in December 1972 that 
the Utah Attorney General questioned the legality 
of the University's investments. We responded to 
this at p. 3, supra. 
(4) That there is an issue of fact whether Donald Catron 
received orders to buy no more stock in December 
1972. This is not at issue. The issue rather was, 
if Catron had been so instructed were the broker-
dealer s so advised. It is uncontroverted that they 
were not advised that Catron's authority had been 
revoked until all of the subject transactions had 
been completed.* 
Finally, the University implies by note 35 at page 72 of its 
brief that it engaged in no discovery because the court limited dis-
covery to a month. Discovery was only so limited because it was the 
broker-dealers who were seeking discovery in connection with the 
University's motion for summary judgment and the University strenu-
ously objected to the broker-dealers receiving any more time. If, 
in over three years in the proceedings below the University elected 
not to engage in discovery, it should not now be heard to complain. 
In summary, all the foregoing assertions by the University are 
entirely devoid of merit, and judgment should be entered in favor of 
* Merrill Lynch, R. 1433 (Stromberg Affidavit); id. at 1422 
(Dunn Affidavit); Bear Stearns, R. 1998 (Cranston Affidavit); Vol. 
22, R. 1975 (Kaplan Affidavit for Hornblower); Sutro, R. 122 
(Juda Affidavit). 
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the broker-dealers on their motions to dismiss, for the reasons 
advanced in their opening brief on these appeals. 
PART TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS 
POINT I 
THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO 
INVOKE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY TO THE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY 
THE BROKER-DEALERS. 
A. The Third-Party Defendants May Not Claim Official Immunity 
Because They Exceeded Their Authority in Approving the Transactions 
at Issue Here. 
If this court holds that the University officials were acting 
outside their authority such that the doctrine of estoppel will not 
be applied to the Univesity to bar its claims against the broker-
dealers, then it follows that the third party defendants are not 
protected by official immunity because they acted outside their 
authority. See discussion at p. 25, supra, of relationship between 
the University's estoppel and the immunity claimed by third-party 
defendants. Here we assume, arguendo, in connection with the 
broker-dealers' claims against the third parties that the University 
* is not estopped because its officials acted outside their authority 
and that accordingly the third-party defendants have no immunity. 
In their effort to invoke official immunity as a defense to the 
E~en if ~he University is not estopped, the broker-dealers 
are s~ill entitle~ to prevail against the University under the 
doctrine that monies paid pursuant to an unlawful contract may 
not be recovered. 
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third party complaints, the officers and members attempt a semantic 
distinction between conduct "within the scope of their duties" and 
conduct "within the scope of their authority" (their brief at 6, 8). 
The essence of this argument appears to be that while they "exceeded 
their authority" in approving the subject transactions, they were 
nonetheless acting generally "within the scope of their duties" to 
supervise University fiscal affairs and therefore are immune from 
liability. This distinction is semantic, not logical. 
While there is some authority for the proposition that public 
officers are not individually liable for simple "mistakes in the 
exercise of [their] judgment," if they have statutory authority to 
exercise such judgment in the first place, Anderson v. Granite 
School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 407, 413 P.2d 597, 599 (1966), it 
is well-established in Utah that such officers are liable for their 
torts where they are mistaken with respect to basic jurisdictional 
facts and where, as a result, they take action for which they have 
no valid statutory authority. Several Utah decisions highlight this 
distinction. -
One of the clearest examples of this principle is provided by 
Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1128 (1936). In that case 
city commissioners were subject to individual liability for a tort 
they committed in attempting to discharge their discretionary author-
ity, since they exercised that authority pursuant to a city ordi-
nance which was invalid. 
Since the commissioners there directed the police to act on the 
basis of an unconstitutional ordinance, the Supreme Court held that 
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they were liable to plaintiffs as joint tortfeasors for directing a 
trespass on plaintiffs' property. Id. at 527-28, 57 P.2d at 1131. 
The court held the commissioners to be liable because of this mis-
take with respect to basic jurisdictional facts even though the 
defendants acted in good faith and in the exercise of their best 
judgment in attempting to enforce city ordinances. Id. at 529, 57 
P.2d at 1132. 
on the other hand, in Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 
P.2d 1085 (1935), state tax commissioners were held not indivi-
dually liable in accepting less than the full amount of taxes due 
from a hospital because they had express statutory authority to 
compromise tax claims. Accordingly, since they acted within their 
authority in compromising this particular claim, they could not be 
held subject to individual liability even if they made a mistake in 
judgment in deciding to do so. Id. at 385, 44 P.2d at 1089. 
The foregoing distinction between acts which will or will not 
give rise to personal liability of public officers is one which has 
been consistently followed by this court. In Blonquist v. Summit 
County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971), this court held that 
county officials would be personally liable to plaintiffs if they 
were mistaken with respect to basic jurisdictional facts. The court 
noted that not all conduct by public officers "acting in line of 
duty" is insulated from suit. Id. at 388-89, 483 P.2d at 431. 
There, the defendants decided that a certain road was public, and 
they therefore directed that a locked gate on that road, maintained 
by the plaintiffs, should be removed. In fact, however, the corn-
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missioners had no authority to determine whether the road was public 
or private, and their order to tear down the gate was therefore 
invalid. Id. at 390-91, 483 P.2d at 432. 
Probably one of the clearest statements as to whe~ liability 
may or may not be asserted against a public officer was provided 
by the United States Supreme Court in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). The Court there noted that 
"official action is [not] invalid if based on an incorrect decision 
as to law or fact, if the officer making the decision was empowered 
to do so." Id. at 695 (emphasis added). In other words, if a public 
officer has authority to take the action complained of, he will not 
be liable for an error in judgment. If he lacks statutory authority 
so to act, however, he is liable. 
In these cases, if this court affirms its holding in First 
Equity Corp. v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), it 
cannot be denied that these officers and Council members lacked 
basic statutory authority to authorize the subject transactions. 
They did not simply exercise bad judgment in selecting specific 
securities which the University had authority to purchase; their 
mistake was fundamental, because the University had no power what-
soever to purchase those securities. For this reason, they were 
clearly mistaken with respect to basic jurisdictional facts upon 
which they based the representations in their corporate resolutions, 
and they are therefore precluded from asserting the defense of 
official immunity. 
Nor are the cases cited by the third-party defendants to the 
contrary. For example, in Lister v. Board of Regents of University 
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of Wisconsin System, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976), cited 
throughout their brief and quoted at some length at 13, four former 
University of Wisconsin law students sought to recover the differ-
ence between nonresident and resident tuition which they had paid 
for two school years. Named defendants were the University System 
Board of Regents and the Registrar of the University of Wisconsin. 
The only "excess of authority" asserted by the plaintiffs 
against the Registrar was his alleged misinterpretation of the 
standards set forth in the state statutes which governed the resi-
dent/nonresident determination. The court held that the registrar 
could properly assert official immunity in response to this claim 
of a simple error in judgment in exercising his valid statutory 
authority, as he was expressly empowered to make the resident/ 
nonresident decision. 240 N.W.2d at 622. 
Immediately following the text quoted by third-party defen-
dants in their brief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court went on to state 
that "there is no substantive liability for damages resulting from 
mistakes in judgment where the officer is specifically empowered to 
exercise such judgment." Id. As the third-party defendants in 
these cases were not specifically empowered to exercise any kind of 
judgment with respect to purchasing all the stock here at issue, the 
Lister decision affords them no support. 
Similarly, the third-party defendants' reliance on McQuillin's 
treatise (quoted at 20 of their brief) for the proposition that 
public officers will not be held liable on contracts which they 
execute is also misplaced. Again, almost immediately following the 
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passage quoted by third-party defendants, McQuillin states that "if 
public officers in making contracts go beyond or exceed the author-
ity given them, they may become personally liable." 4 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations §12.214, at 171 (3d ed. 1979). Similarly, 
McQuillin notes that an officer may be "held liable for the injur-
ious consequences of his discretionary acts when he exceeds his 
authority." Id. §12.201. McQuillin warns that: 
An officer may pay out public money only in 
the manner prescribed by law. Money disbursed 
by him in an unlawful manner is paid out at his 
peril. Accordingly, where funds are disbursed 
illegally by public officers or upon their 
authority, they are personally liable therefor, 
e.g., payments under illegal contracts 
Even the fact that illegal expenditures were 
made by officers under the honest belief that 
they were authorized does not prevent recovery 
from such officers. 
Id. §12.217, at 181 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). 
For the foregoing reasons, the third-party defendants must not 
be allowed to invoke official immunity as a shield for their con-
duct in these cases. 
B. Sound Judicial Policy Requires That These Public Officers 
be Subject to Personal Liability for the Conduct Complained of by 
the Broker-Dealers Herein. 
As the foregoing argument demonstrates, the third-party defen-
dants' assertion that they are entitled to official immunity is un-
supported at law. Similarly, sound judicial policy requires that 
their conduct give rise to liability in these cases. 
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The officers and members assert the usual timeworn policy argu-
ments that official "immunity has been deemed necessary to ensure 
that public officials are free to exercise their duties unencumbered 
by the fear of damage suits growing out of the performance of 
(their] duties." Third-party Defendants' Brief at 7. This argu-
ment should not avail them here for several reasons. 
First of all, the liability which the broker-dealers here assert 
is no greater than the liability which could successfully be asserted 
against members of governing boards of private corporations, or other 
private individuals. Consistent with recent holdings by this court 
and others, there is no sound policy basis for allowing public offi-
cers to be held to a lower standard of honesty and responsibility in 
their business transactions than the standard to which private 
individuals are held. See, ~' Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah 1980) (in which this court adopted a 
policy expressly designed to allow more citizens injured by tortious 
governmental conduct access to the courts for redress); Celebrity 
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control commission, 602 P.2d 689, 695 
(Utah 1979). These actions are based upon common law principles of 
indemnity, restitution, and contribution which could successfully be 
asserted as to private individuals, and which should also be allowed 
against public officers. 
The "fear of damage suits" which the officers and members 
assert would attend the imposition of personal liability on public 
officials is also illusory. As Justice Stewart recently pointed out 
in Standiford, where a public entity (or officer) is protected from 
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that liability by insurance purchased by the sovereign, this concern 
has no basis. As Justice Stewart explained: 
The insurance authorization is relevant as to 
whether a governmental entity should be sub-
jected to liability on tort claims because one 
historical fear of limiting immunity has been 
the unexpected and unplanned-for expense to the 
public entity. With the availability of insur-
ance protection, coupled with the statutory pro-
visions for a ceiling on liability, governmental 
entities may confidently and accurately budget 
for their potential tort liability. 
Id. at 1235. 
Similarly, Section 63-30-33 of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act specifically authorizes the purchase of insurance by any govern-
mental entity to insure any or all of its employees against lia-
bility for injury or damage. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-33 (1978). Such 
insurance was purchased for each of these third-party defendants by 
the state. Indeed, counsel for third-party defendants were employed 
by the insurance carrier. if the purchase of liability insurance 
authorized by the Immunity Act was not considered by the legislature 
to constitute a waiver of employees' common law official immunity, 
at least to the extent of the coverage, the legislature would simply 
have been authorizing gifts in the way of premium payments to the 
insurance companies. Manifestly, this result is absurd and it must 
be concluded that the purchase of insurance waived immunity for the 
officers and members.* 
Finally, the officers and members assert that they cannot be 
held individually liable here because the Institutional Council 
* This position was argued at length to the court below in 
the defendants' joint memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss 
the third-party complaints, at 16-21. 
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itself is the only defendant which can properly incur such lia-
bility, as the individuals did not act individually but instead 
acted as a body in executing their corporate resolutions (their 
brief at 20). In fact, no law is offered to support any such pro-
position, because no such law exists. 
Furthermore, however, there could be no conceivable policy 
basis for such a conclusion. That is, there can be no rational 
basis for holding that conduct which would give rise to liability 
if done individually will suddenly be insulated from liability 
simply because more than one person joined in to perform the same 
act. Indeed, at least one Utah decision suggests that the proper 
method for asserting liability in such cases is to sue the various 
public officers as joint tortfeasors, where several officers have 
acted in concert in order to take action on behalf of the public 
entity. Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah at 527, 57 P.2d at 1131. 
C. The Officers Must at Least be Held Personally Liable for 
Failure to Perform Ministerial Functions. 
As the broker-dealers asserted in the court below and in their 
original brief in these cases (at 72 & n.211), the broker-dealers 
stated a cause of action against the officers and members for fail-
ing to notify them for several months of their revocation of 
Catron's authority, a purely ministerial act. As noted by the 
officers and members in their brief at 6, it must be accepted as 
true for purposes of this appeal that Catron's authority was revoked 
on December 4, 1972, but no notice of that revocation was given 
the broker-dealers until March 1973. 
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The officers and members do not argue in their brief that there 
is no liability for such conduct, so we assume that they have con-
ceded the merit of this assertion. Accordingly, the officers and 
members should at least be held personally liable to the broker-
dealers for all damages attributable to the time period between 
December 1972 and March 1973. 
POINT II 
THE BROKER-DEALERS' CLAIMS FOR INDEMNITY STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
The officers and members contend that the broker-dealers failed 
to state a cause of action for indemnity because they were in fact 
equally as culpable as those officers and members (in their brief 
at 17). That assertion cannot avail them on this appeal for several 
reasons. 
First, the well-pled f~cts set forth in the pleadings must be 
* deemed to be true for purposes of this appeal. In its complaints 
against the broker-dealers, the University merely alleges that the 
broker-dealers faithfully carried out the instructions of one of 
the third-party defendants, Donald Catron, who in turn was expressly 
empowered to enter into the subject securities transactions by these 
officers and members. 
The broker-dealers alleged in the third-party complaints that 
they acted in reliance on the Institutional Council warranties of 
authority and capacity in entering these transactions, that they 
did not know that the University lacked such authority, that the 
* Discovery was not commenced until after the court granted 
the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss. 
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third-party defendants were negligent or grossly negligent in fail-
ing to determine that these securities transactions might be ultra 
vires, and that the broker-dealers were purely innocent agents for 
the University. 
Under that state of pleadings, the broker-dealers have clearly 
asserted that the officers and members were more culpable in enter-
ing these transactions than were the broker-dealers. Under such 
circumstances, as the officers and members have conceded in their 
brief (at 17), a cause for indemnity is properly asserted. 
Finally, the broker-dealers are less culpable than the offi-
cers and members as a matter of law, since the only "wrongdoing" 
with which they are charged is the assertion that they had construc-
tive notice of the illegality of these transactions. As argued at 
some length in the broker-dealers' original brief on these appeals 
(at 66 and at nn.120-25), the brokerdealers must be relieved of the 
burden of constructive notice in these cases because they justi-
fiably relied on express warranties of authority and capacity dir-
ected to them by these third-party defendants. At bottom, the only 
grounds for asserting that the broker-dealers had such constructive 
knowledge is that they were dealing with the sovereign, and it is 
proper, so the implied argument goes, to invent some theory to pro-
tect the sovereign and its officials. This raises the same issue 
regarding archaic and unjustified sovereign privileges addressed by 
this court in Standiford. The "constructive notice" argument ad-
vanced by the third-party defendants is simply a disguised way of 
claiming the benefits of sovereign immunity without giving reasons. 
-46-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINTS STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR COMMON LAW CONTRIBUTION 
As an alternative to their claims for indemnity, the broker-
dealers have alleged that they are at least entitled to contribu-
tion from the third-party defendants if the trial court should 
eventually determine that the broker-dealers are equally as cul-
pable as those third-party defendants. The officers and members 
have responded (in their brief at 21-22) that the broker-dealers' 
claims for contribution state no cause of action because these 
actions arose before May 8, 1973, the effective date of the Utah 
contribution statute. 
The doctrine of contribution rests upon "principles of equity 
and natural justice." 18 Am. Jur. 2d Contribution §4 (1965). The 
general rule is that one wh? is compelled to pay or satisfy the 
whole or to bear more than his fair share of a common burden or 
obligation, upon which several persons are equally liable or which 
they are bound to discharge, is entitled to contribution against the 
others to obtain from them payment of their respective shares. 
Restatement of Restitution §81 (1937). 
There is a right of contribution for acts occurring prior to 
the enactment of Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Ann., permitting con-
tribution between joint tortfeasors. Contribution was permitted 
prior to the Act in cases where the wrongful act of the person 
seeking contribution was not intentional or negligent. The later 
Utah contribution statute simply expands the circumstances under 
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which contribution is allowed, to include recovery against tort-
feasors. 
In Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 P. 833 (1896), plaintiff 
was a trustee for defendant with respect to certain property. Def-
endant told the trustee that the property was wrongfully possessed 
and requested that appropriate legal action be conunenced. An action 
was commenced and a judgment was entered ejecting the occupier of 
the premises. Subsequently, however, the ejected occupier brought 
suit in trespass, claiming that the conunissioner hearing the case 
did not have proper jurisdiction to do so. A judgment was entered 
against the trustee. 
The trustee (Culmer) then brought an action against defendant 
for contribution, alleging that his participation in the initial 
action was done in good faith in the firm belief that the commission 
hearing the trespass action had proper jurisdiction, and at the 
express direction of the defendant. The court concluded that 
where a "tort is one arising from construction or inference of 
law, and not arising from a known meditated wrong," the person 
charged with liability because of constructive knowledge could 
recover contribution from the person at whose direction he was 
acting. Id. at 141, 44 P. at 836. 
Similarly, in these cases, if the broker-dealers are held 
liable to the University because they are charged with construc-
tive knowledge that these transactions were ultra vires, they should 
be entitled to conunon law contribution from the persons at whose 
direction they acted, i.e., these officers and Council members. 
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Similarly, in Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P. 512 (1903), 
the court found that plaintiff's liability-creating conduct had been 
innocent in purpose, and therefore his action for contribution 
stated a cause of action. There, plaintiff acted in good faith upon 
defendant's representation that plaintiff could take possession of 
certain chattels upon which defendant had a chattel mortgage. In 
taking possession he was not aware that his actions constituted a 
tort. While no one can "relieve himself from the consequences of 
having intentionally committed an unlawful act by seeking •• 
contribution," the court noted, it is also true that "justice and 
sound policy" require that contribution should be allowed where 
the party held liable was acting upon the affirmative representa-
tion of another and where he did not know that his conduct was 
illegal. Id. at 449, 73 P. at 514. 
The cases relied upon by the third-party defendants are not to 
the contrary. In both of those cases, the plaintiffs sought con-
tribution for their own negligent or willful misconduct, and this 
court therefore barred contribution. Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, 
551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976); Hardman v. Matthews, 1 Utah 2d 110, 262 
P.2d 748 (1953). 
POINT IV 
THE BROKER-DEALERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED 
ON THE THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS EVEN IF THIS COURT 
REVERSES THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
ENTERED BY THE COURT BELOW IN FAVOR OF THE UNI-
VERSITY AND GRANTS THE BROKER-DEALERS' MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS THE UNIVERSITY'S CLAIMS. 
The officers and members assert (at 24) that the broker-dealers 
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cannot "maintain an action over if they are not held liable in the 
first instance." The broker-dealers respectfully submit, however, 
that they should be allowed to recover all costs and expenses of 
litigation they have incurred and to proceed even if they prevail 
on this appeal in opposing the University's claims against them. 
so to hold would be consistent with the majority view in this 
country. McCormick on Damages, §66 at 246, §67 at 248 ("Breaches 
of official duty may likewise subject the victim to the necessity 
of engaging in litigation, for the expense of which he may recover 
from the officer"), §68 (recovery for the expense of litigation is 
allowed in indemnity cases) (1935). The sole case cited by third-
party defendants is inapposite because (1) that court never stated 
either that the third-party complaint prayed for indemnity or that 
it prayed for recovery of costs and counsel fees, and (2) even if the 
court had so held on this issue, that holding would have been clearly 
contrary to the majority view and sound policy. southern Milling co. 
v. United States, 270 F.2d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 1959) (cited by third-
party defendants at 24). 
As Moore points out in discussing Rule 14 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (identical to Utah R. Civ. P. 14), Rule 14 is pro-
cedural only and in no way modifies substantive right. 3 Moore's 
Federal Practice, 1114.03(3) (2d ed. 1979). If the right to indemnity 
or contribution properly exists, Rule 14 merely provides "the pro-
cedure for its enforcement." Id. at 14-158. 
In successful suits for indemnity the indemnitee is entitled 
to reimbursement by the indemnitor for all damages sustained, in-
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eluding costs and attorneys' fees incurred in defending the primary 
action. ~, McCormick, supra. A recent decision by the Oregon 
supreme Court aptly summarizes this general principle: 
The rule in most jurisdictions, regardless of 
whether indemnity is based upon an implied or an 
express agreement, is that when a claim is made 
against an indemnitee for which he is entitled 
to indemnification, the indemnitor is liable for 
any reasonable expenses incurred by the indemnitee 
in defending against such claim, regardless of 
whether the inderr~itee is ultimately held not 
liable. Paliaga v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 301 
F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1962); Miller and Company 
of Birmingham v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 328 F.2d 
73, 78 (5th Cir. 1964); Southern Arizona York 
Refrigeration Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1, 
60 (9th Cir. 1964); O'Connell v. Jackson, 273 
Minn. 91, 140 N.W. 2d 65, 69 (1966); Commercial 
Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 86 Ariz. 288, 345 
P.2d 210, 216 (1959); Restatement, Restitution 
§ 80, Comment b., 356. We so hold. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Crosetti Bros., Inc., 256 Or. 
576, 475 P.2d 69, 71 (1970) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the third-party actions should be revived even 
if the court dismisses the University's complaints against the 
broker-dealers. 
PART THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING MERRILL LYNCH'S 
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE AND THE OTHER BROKER-
DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN PER-
SONAM JURISDICTION. 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE ACTION AROSE IN AND MERRILL LYNCH 
RESIDES IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, VENUE IN CACHE 
COUNTY IS NOT PROPER AS TO MERRILL LYNCH. 
Merrill Lynch asserts that the cause of action arose in Salt 
Lake County and the University asserts that it arose in Cache County. 
-51-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In its brief, the University argues that the cause of action arose 
in cache County since the "wrong" occurred there, i.e., payment was 
made from Logan by a Logan bank acting as agent for Merrill Lynch. 
The University's arguments are incorrect. 
A. A Cause of Action Arises Where the Defendant's Wrongful 
Act occurs. Any wrongful Acts Allegedly Committed by Merrill Lynch 
Must Have Occurred in Salt Lake County. 
The cause of action arises where the defendant's allegedly 
wrongful acts or omissions occurred. Bach v. Brown, 17 Utah 435, 
53 P. 991 (1898). The wrong alleged against Merrill Lynch in the 
case sub judice is that from 1970 through 1973 Merrill Lynch unlaw-
fully engaged in the purchase and sale of securities pursuant to 
instructions given it by the governing body of the University. In 
asserting that acceptance of the University's funds by Merrill Lynch 
in Logan constituted the "wrong" for purposes of determining where 
the cause of action arose, the University ignores the relatively 
more significant portions of the allegedly illegal transactions in 
question. See Akichika v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P.2d 283 
(1975) (an action for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of a 
conditional sales contract, use of bank as an agent for transfer of 
title merely incidental to and not an integral part of transaction at 
issue). 
The University focuses on the last technical act necessary to 
complete the whole transaction, i.e., acceptance of payment for the 
securities, which should have little relevance to evaluating whether 
venue is proper. Indeed, the stock collection transactions were 
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nothing more than "routine clerical matters." (Hornblower, R. 664). 
To argue that no wrong occurs until payment is accepted, as the 
University asserts, is naive. 
The University mischaracterizes Merrill Lynch's position as 
relying upon acceptance of purchase orders in Salt Lake County as 
the sole portion of the transaction constituting the "wrong" (Uni-
versity's brief at 97). Such a characterization ignores Merrill 
Lynch's brief, which stated that "Merrill Lynch assented to the 
transactions in question from its place of business in Salt Lake 
County, and all other actions taken by it in this state on the Uni-
versity's behalf occurred there." (Merrill Lynch Brief at 76) 
(emphasis added). In other words, Merrill Lynch's acceptance and 
execution of the University's orders constitute the wrong Merrill 
Lynch allegedly committed. 
The University's complaint is in accord with this assertion, 
since it claims that it was damaged as a consequence of Merrill 
Lynch's execution of orders for the purchase of securities. (See, 
~· Merrill Lynch R. at 2, ,,,, 9, 13). Since Merrill. Lynch exe-
cuted the transactions in Salt Lake County, where it conducts its 
Utah business, any wrongful acts or omissions necessarily occurred 
there. 
The original brokerage agreement was entered into in Salt Lake 
County; all orders to buy and sell were placed by Merrill Lynch from 
its Salt Lake offices; while conducting the transactions in Salt Lake 
County, Merrill Lynch allegedly failed to make any investigation of 
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the university's corporate authority; Merrill Lynch received payment 
in Salt Lake County; and Merrill Lynch has its only place of business 
for this state in Salt Lake County. (Merrill Lynch, R. 21, 22, 28, 
30, 31, 32). 
Even if it were shewn that Merrill Lynch did in fact accept 
transfers of funds in Logan (by the University transferring money to 
a bank in Logan which it designated which in turn passed the money 
on to Merrill Lynch in Salt Lake County), it is not uncommon for a 
defendant in a complex transaction to have contacts in different 
judicial districts. When faced with such situations, the courts 
"have fashioned what may be called a 'weight of contacts' approach." 
Ghazoul v. International Management Services, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 307, 
314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court in that case further stated: 
"[T]he weight of defendant's contacts in the various 
districts concerned must be compared, and the 
claim must be deemed to have arisen in the dis-
trict where the contacts had been most significant." 
• • • "The cause of action for venue purposes can 
be said to arise wherever substantial material 
events took place. 
Id. at 315 (citations omitted). 
In the present case, the "weight of contacts" for venue purposes 
Ii 
lies in Salt Lake County. All material events surrounding the alleg· L 
edly unlawful sale and purchase of securities necessarily occurred in 
Salt Lake County where Merrill Lynch conducts all its Utah business. 
(Merrill Lynch R. 31, 32). 
Finally, the University ignores the clear policy of the venue 
statute, which by offering the alternative of the county where the 
defendant resides or in which the claim arose, places venue in those 
counties which would be most convenient to the defendant. Utah 
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code Ann. §78-13-7 (1977). The statute conspicuously omits as an 
alternative the county where the plaintiff resides. 
B. Merrill Lynch Did Not Receive Payment in Cache County 
and the Logan Bank Was Not an Agent of Merrill Lynch. 
The preceding section demonstrates that even if Merrill Lynch 
had received payment in Cache County, venue is not proper there. In 
fact, however, all payments to Merrill Lynch were accepted in Salt 
Lake County. 
Merrill Lynch received payment by mail from the University 
(Merrill Lynch R. 96, 98). Even the University concedes that in a 
number of cases Catron mailed checks to Merrill Lynch in Salt Lake 
which were drawn on the University's bank in Logan (University's 
Brief at 94). It follows that Merrill Lynch only accepted payment 
when it received those checks and cashed them in Salt Lake. 
On other occasions, Catron would request that Merrill Lynch 
send securities to a Logan bank he had selected (University's Brief 
at 95). The bank would then request approval and funds from the 
University and, upon receiving them, would transmit the money to 
Merrill Lynch by mail (id.). Again, Merrill Lynch received payment 
only upon receipt of those funds in Salt Lake City. 
Nevertheless, the University argues that the bank in Logan 
(designated by the University) was an agent for Merrill Lynch; 
therefore, payment was accomplished either upon the University's 
transfer of funds to its own designated bank or upon its approval for 
the bank to transmit funds to Merrill Lynch. The University bases 
this argument on a strained interpretation of the banking rule that, 
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prior to the time of settlement, a collecting bank is an agent or 
sub-agent for the owner of an item. Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-201(1) 
(1968). This provision was not intended to resolve venue questions. 
Indeed, Official Comment (4) to the Uniform Commercial Code cites 
several other purposes or results flowing from Section 201(1), in-
eluding the resolution of any risk of loss disputes. 
Furthermore, even if the Logan banks were deemed to be collect-
ing banks rather than payor banks, the Uniform Commercial Code states 
at §70-8-313(1) (1968) that delivery of a security to a purchaser 
"occurs when he or a person designated by him acquires possession of 
a security." Under this provision, it is clear that the deli very to 
the University occurred when the Logan bank received the securities, 
since Catron designated the bank as the University's agent. (Merrill 
Lynch, R. 96 and 98). The University's reliance on §70A-4-201(1) is 
misplaced since that section states that a bank is the agent of the 
"owner" and according to §70A-3-313(1) the University became the 
owner upon delivery of securities to the Logan bank. This is also 
made clear by §70A-8-313 (2), which provides that "[t] he purchaser is 
the owner of the security held for him by his broker. " Accordingly, 
under the provisions of the UCC, which the University considers con-
trolling (though we believe irrelevant), the Logan bank, as the 
agent of the "owner", was clearly the agent of the University, not 
of this defendant. 
-56-
~ 
I 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION 
OVER BEAR STEARNS, HORNBLOWER AND SUTRO. 
The lower court erroneously held that Bear Stearns, Hornblower 
and Sutro were subject to in personam jurisdiction on the basis of 
"contacts" with this state which consisted of advertisements in 
national periodicals and the mailing of securities, confirmation 
slips, and monthly statements to the University in Logan (Memo-
randurn Decision, Bear Stearns R. 293). In its brief the University 
further notes that these broker-dealers conversed by telephone with 
University employees concerning the transactions at issue, and that 
two of the three broker-dealers had registered as such with the Utah 
Securities Commission -- Hornblower registered prior to the trans-
actions at issue and Bear Stearns registered subsequent thereto. On 
the basis of these contacts the University erroneously argues that 
the broker-dealers are subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah 
under both the "doing business" and the "significant minimal con-
tacts" tests, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-20 and 78-27-22 (1977). 
A. The Broker-Dealers Were Not "Doing Business" in this 
State nor did they have Significant Minimal Contacts Here to Sub-
ject Them to In Personam Jurisdiction. 
The broker-dealers are not properly subject to in personam 
jurisdiction in this State under either test. Under the "doing 
business" test, the contacts proffered by the University do not 
satisfy the "solicitation plus" rule, especially since the broker-
dealers cannot be deemed to have engaged in the solicitation of 
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business in this state for a long time and in a continuous, system-
atic manner. None of the broker-dealers, nor any of their officers, 
employees or agents, has ever maintained offices, telephones, tele-
phone listings, office equipment, employees, agents, bank accounts, 
records, or the like in the State of Utah (Sutro, R.39, 41; Bear 
Stearns, R. 60, 100; Hornblower, R. 36-37, 39, 75). It is clear the 
broker-dealers were not doing business in Utah; the University, 
rather, was doing business in California. It voluntarily decided to 
conduct its stock purchasing business in California rather than in 
Utah. It opened accounts with agent-brokers in California, main-
tained its accounts there and authorized the purchase of stocks in 
those accounts (Hornblower, R. 20, 38; Sutro, R. 36-37, 40, 42, 44; 
Bear Stearns, R. 51, 151, 61, 261). From California and New York, 
the University's orders were executed and the securities purchased 
(Hornblower, R. 74; Sutro, R. 39; Bear Stearns, R. 100). 
Nor do the broker-dealers' contacts with the State of Utah 
constitute the significant minimum contacts required by the long-arm 
statute. The University has not shown that the broker-dealers 
engaged in substantial activities within the state beyond the 
insignificant and incidental contacts mentioned above. The contacts 
relied upon by the University and the court below do not constitute 
significant minimum contacts in the State of Utah such that the 
maintenance of the suit in this State does not offend "traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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The University erroneously contends that the case sub judice 
is somehow squarely controlled by the decision in Piantes v. Hayden-
Stone, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 110, 514 P.2d 529 (1973). The court in that 
case did not state that the telephone calls to Utah from the defen-
dant's offices in California were sufficient contacts for asserting in 
personam jurisdiction over the defendant. The holding, rather, 
turned on numerous telephone solicitations into Utah together with 
at least eight personal solicitations in Utah. In the present case, 
on the other hand, there were telephone conversations between the 
University in Utah and the broker-dealers in California, but the 
broker-dealers did not travel to Utah to solicit the sale or pur-
chase of securities. Rather, Catron traveled to California on 
several occasions to deal personally with the broker-dealers. The 
instances of physical presence in Piantes, as in so many other 
cases, made the quality and, nature of the nonresident defendant's 
contacts much less likely to offend due process considerations than 
in the present case, where such contacts are lacking. 
The University attempts to distinguish the cases relied on by 
the broker-dealers in their earlier Brief. Nevertheless, the Univer-
sity's distinctions are not persuasive and those cases still support 
the broker-dealers' contention that they should not be subject to in 
personam jurisdiction in this State. 
B. The Broker-Dealers Did Not Engage in Purposeful Acts 
Within This Forum Sufficient to Justify This State's Assertion 
of Personal Jurisdiction. 
The University relies on the fact that two of the broker-dealers--
Hornblower and Bear Stearns--registered with the Utah Securities 
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conunission, and, by virtue of that contact, jurisdiction over them is 
warranted. This fact, however, is not relevant in this context. The 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act state that registration 
with the Conunission constitutes irrevocable consent of service in 
any action which arises under that act. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-26 (6) & (7) (1978). 
Such registration does not bring the broker-dealers within the 
long-arm statute. This is made clear in Koplin v. Saul Lerner Co., 
52 Ill. App. 2d 97, 201 N.E.2d 763 (App. Ct. 1964). That case is 
particularly pertinent because, as the University states in its 
Brief, the Utah long-arm statute was modeled after the Illinois 
statute. There, the court held that the state had no personal juris-
diction over nonresident broker-dealers even though they had regis-
tered in Illinois. "Registration with the Secretary of State did 
not bring the defendants within Section 17 [the 'doing business' 
provision of the Illinois long-arm statute], nor did it vest juris-
diction in Illinois." 201 N.E.2d at 767. 
The University also makes the tenuous argument that jurisdiction 
over the broker-dealers is warranted on the basis of the trade name 
protection this state affords a person if that person files an appli-
cation in the office of the secretary of state. There is no evidence 
presented to the effect that the broker-dealers have purposefully 
acted to avail themselves of this protection. 
c. Notions of Fair Play and Justice Dictate That Personal 
Jurisdiction in this State Should Not Be Asserted Over the Broker-
Dealers. 
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The University also relies on the extent to which the broker-
dealers engage in interstate commerce for support of its contention 
that litigating in Utah will not result in inconvenience, expense, 
and prejudice for the broker-dealers. The University's claim is 
premised on the broker-dealers' registration in numerous states, as 
well as their advertisements in nationally circulated periodicals. 
such activities do not suffice to demonstrate that anyone is engaged 
in interstate commerce to such an extent that he would not be incon-
venienced by defending an action in a foreign state. On the con-
trary, mere registration and advertising do not demonstrate that a 
person has even begun to engage in any business whatsoever. See 
id. (registration merely indicated plans and preparation f?r doing 
business in Illinois; advertising merely indicated desire and hope of 
doing business there). Where the broker-dealers' total contacts with 
this forum are quite insignificant, and where they have not been 
shewn to be engaged extensively in interstate commerce, it seems 
patently prejudicial and inconvenient for the broker-dealers to 
defend an action in the State of Utah. 
The University also argues that since public money was involved 
in the transactions at issue the broker-dealers should be required to 
defend in Utah. Whether public money is involved is irrelevant to 
the question of whether due process notions are offended. 
The University also relies on the fact that the broker-dealers 
advertise in national publications, some of which are circulated in 
Utah. The University found no advertisements by the broker-dealers 
in Utah media because they do not advertise in Utah. (Bear Stearns, 
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R. 100). However, national advertising of the kind done by the 
broker-dealers is no basis for jurisdiction in Utah. The Utah Legis-
lature has recognized that it would be unfair and unreasonable to 
require foreign broker-dealers to register in Utah simply because 
they advertise in national publications which reach Utah. 
An off er to sell or to buy is not made in this 
state when the publisher circulates or there is 
circulated on his behalf in this state any bona 
fide newspaper or other publication of general, 
regular, and paid circulation which is not pub-
lished in this state, or which is published in 
this state but has had more than two-thirds of 
its circulation outside this state during the 
past 12 months • • • . 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26 (4) (1978). 
National advertising therefore not only fails to meet a "doing 
business" test, but does not even constitute an offer to do business. 
No person should be subject to personal jurisdiction in a foreign 
state in which he does no business simply because he advertises in 
prestigious national business publications to reach markets where he 
does do business. 
The University erroneously asserts that the use of the services 
of Utah banks "would certainly seem to be doing business in the State 
of Utah." It is uncontroverted that the University, not the broker-
dealers, designated the banks in Logan, Utah to accept stock certifi-
cates and to transmit the University's money to the broker-dealers' 
banks in California and New York. (Hornblower, R. 73 and 74; Sutro, 
R. 120; Bear Stearns, R. 100). That Utah banks agreed to act for the 
Univesity should not suffice to establish in personam jurisdiction 
over the broker-dealers. Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court in Akichi~ 
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v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P.2d 283 (1975), refused.to find the 
defendant to be "doing business" even though one of defendant's 
contacts with the forum state consisted of the use of an Idaho bank 
to transfer title to the truck involved in that controversy. 
see also Hamilton Brothers, Inc. v. Peterson, 445 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 
1971) (no personal jurisdiction where defendant's contacts with forum 
state included deposit of money in a bank in that state). 
Finally, to support its argument that sufficient contacts 
exist, the University asserts that the broker-dealers solicited 
business from the University, relying on telephone calls in which the 
brokers recommended that the University purchase or sell particular 
stocks. In addition, the University relies upon the Sutro-sponsored 
seminar in California which Catron attended as further evidence of 
solicitation on the part of Sutro. 
The broker-dealers did not solicit business from the University; 
rather, the University, through Catron, initiated the relationship by 
opening accounts in California (Sutro, R. 36-37, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 
123; Hornblower, R. 20, 38; Bear Stearns, R. 151, 261). Subsequent 
telephone conversations occurred during the course of the University's 
transaction of business with the broker-dealers in California in 
which some securities were actually recommended. In Sutro's case, 
however, it is uncontroverted that it recommended none of the 
securities purchased by the University (Sutro: Affidavits of Juda, 
40; Johnson, 42; and Dyckman, 44). 
Finally, the University relies on Industrial Commission v. 
Kemmerer Coal Co., 106 Utah 476, 150 P.2d 373 (1944), for the pro-
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position that "very little more" than solicitation is necessary to 
constitute "doing business." In that case, however, the defendant 
maintained an office in Utah with agents in this State, and the 
defendant made a "regular and continuous attempt to solicit sales of 
its coal to consumers in Utah through these employees." Id. at 
479-80, 150 P.2d at 374-75. Thus, the activity in that case was of 
longer duration and of a far more continuous, systematic nature than 
that of these broker-dealers here. 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's ruling denying 
these appellants' motions to dismiss for lack of in personam juris-
diction should be reversed. 
DATED this 11"-'-/ day of April, 1980. 
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APPENDIX A 
Cases cited by the University to support its assertion that 
government may always recover ultra vires payments are treated in 
this Appendix. As this discussion reveals, those cases are all 
distinguishable from the circumstances present here. Most signi-
ficantly, none of them raise issues of estoppel or of express 
warranties by the public body as is the case in these appeals. In 
addition, most of them treat instances where the private party was 
asked to return an outright gratuity or where the private party had 
committed some clearly wrongful act. None of them supports recovery 
in the cases at bar, and the broker-dealers also respectfully submit 
that Utah law (understandably not relied upon by the University on 
these issues) is by itself controlling and must lead to judgment in 
their favor. 
The University (at 24) cites Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 
124 P. 2d 34 (Cal. 1942) as allowing a taxpayer "to recover money 
already paid a contractor for work done pursuant to a contract which 
had been let without following bidding procedures." What the Univer-
sity fails to point out, however, is that there were allegations of 
fraud, conspiracy, and collusion between county officials and the 
contractor to pad bills and bilk the public treasury for services 
that were not needed and not performed. Since the appeal to the Calif-
ornia Supreme Court was from a judgment for dismissal in favor of the 
county, the court had to accept those allegations as true. That 
case, then, illustrates the classic situation in which the ultra 
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vires doctrine is applied: that is, where corruption is involved. 
In the instant case, there is neither any evidence nor even a veiled 
allegation of anything other than good faith on the part of the 
broker-dealers. 
In its brief at 26-27, the University cites State v. Axtell, 
393 P.2d 451 (N.M. 1964) for the proposition that "[t]he state could 
recover monies expended pursuant to a seemingly valid legislative 
enactment which was later declared unconstitutional." The brief is 
understandably silent as to the facts of the case. It involved 
legislation allowing the state of New Mexico to put up money, 
matched by federal funds, for the purchase of hay and feed grain for 
ranchers whose animals were endangered by harsh winter weather. The 
statute was subsequently held unconstitutional as a donation of 
public funds. Recovery was sought against ranchers who had bene-
fited from a gratuity, and not from those who had provided the 
services -- the feed sellers. Far from supporting Respondent here-
in, Axtell suggests that the University's remedy must be against 
those members of the usu faculty, staff and student body who re-
ceived the benefits from the early years of the investment program. 
At 27-29 of its brief, the University discusses and quotes 
extensively from Gerzof v. Sweeney, 264 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Ct. App. 
1965), 276 N.Y.S.2d 485 (S.Ct. 1966), 286 N.Y.S.2d 392 (S. Ct. 
1968), modified at 289 N.Y.S.2d 392, and 239 N.E.2d 521 (Ct. App. 
1968). As the University states the facts, "in that case, a con-
tractor installed a generator for the village of Freeport pursuant 
to a contract held to have been awarded in violation of state 
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bidding law." (Brief at 28). But, as the court explained, the 
violation involved "(s]pecifications • prepared 'with the 
active assistance of a representative of the defendant Nordberg' 
and were 'so slanted as to make impossible a bid .• by any other 
manufacturer.'" 239 N.E.2d at 522. As in Miller v. McKinnon, 
supra, the seller of goods and services was a wrongdoer, entitled to 
no equitable consideration. 
While the University quotes the admonition of the Gerzof court 
to the effect that under those circumstances the Village might be 
entitled to retain the generator and the contractor forced to repay 
all money received, the court's actual holding was: 
[T]he patently illegal conduct of the defendants 
entitles them to little consideration, • • • the 
amount to be awarded should be less than [the full 
amount received]. We may adopt this course, in 
the unusual circumstances of the present case, 
without disturbing the salutory rationale and 
policy [of enforcing competitive bidding stat-
utes] •••• The sheer magnitude of the for-
feiture that would be suffered by the defendant 
Nordberg, as well as the corresponding enrichment 
that would inure to the Village of Freeport, •• 
adds an element to this case not to be found in 
any of those in which the principles • • • have 
been applied • 
• . The purposes of our competitive bidding 
statutes may be fully vindicated here without our 
rendering so Draconian a decree as to subject the 
defendant Nordberg to a judgment for over three 
quarters of a million dollars. Justice demands 
that even the burdens and penalties resulting from 
disregard of the law be not so disproportionately 
heavy as to offend conscience. 
239 N.E.2d at 524. 
The remedy allowed by the Gerzof court was payment by the defendant 
of the difference between the price for the expensive equipment that 
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he wrongfully induced the Village to buy, and the price of less 
expensive equipment the Village had desired before defendant's machi-
nations began. Gerzof, then, does not mandate recovery in a good 
faith situation, nor does it even mandate a full recovery from an 
active wrongdoer. 
The other New York cases cited by Respondent as following ~ 
are similarly inapposite. S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 32 
N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105 (1973) did indeed decree that the recipient 
of public funds should return every dollar and take nothing for the 
services it performed. But in that case, the City and company offi-
cials had been convicted of bribery. The court observed that there 
was no "untainted" proof that any work was needed, so it considered 
forfeiture an appropriate remedy. 
In Cupid Diaper Service Corp. v. New York City Health & Hospitals 
Corp., 86 Misc.2d 116, 381 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1976), the court 
simply invalidated an oral modification of a written contract, and 
declared the money received thereunder to be a setoff against claims 
the company made against the hospital. 
In Lance Investigation Service, Inc. v. City of New York, BB 
Misc.2d 117, 387 N.Y.S.2d 32 (App. Div. 1976), there was dicta about 
the right of a governmental agency to recover funds spent pursuant to 
an invalid contract, but the court held that the contract in question 
was valid, and granted summary judgment to plaintiff for the value of 
its services. 
As for the federal cases which the University asserts as follow-
ing Gerzof, Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of Education, 290 F. 
Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), denied a contractor's suit for damages 
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stemming from an alleged breach of an invalid contract. The court 
denied the school board's counterclaim for all money paid under the 
contract, and remanded the case for determination of damages con-
sistent with Gerzof, which, it is again pointed out, does not mean a 
forfeiture of all money received for services actually rendered. 
Board of Education v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 453 F.2d 264 
(2d Cir. 1971), was a related action against a surety in the same 
case. 
At 30-32 of its brief the University cites, without explanation, 
28 cases which it claims "hold that a public body may recover pay-
ments made ultra vires." A review of the facts of each of those 
cases indicates that Respondent's statement of the law is badly 
misleading. This brief will conform to the numbering system used by 
the University. 
1. J.W. Bateson Co.' v. United States, 308 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 
1962) -- Here, a contractor, ,through various artifices, managed to 
sell the same item to the government twice, each time at a profit. 
The action was to force disgorgement of the second profit made. As 
the court said, "This case boils down to unjust enrichment." Id. 
at 514. The recovery involved was for services not performed, a 
situation which does not exist in the present case. 
2. Stone v. United States, 286 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1961) -- In 
this case, the United States recovered payments made to a wood grower 
who was erroneously certified as eligible to participate in a federal 
support program. The recipient of the payments had done nothing to 
earn the money. 
3. State v. Fourth National Bank of Columbus, Ga., 117 So. 2d 
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145 (Ala. 1959) -- This was an action to recover payments made to 
road contractors pursuant to a contract let in violation of the 
competitive bidding statutes. The court mentioned in dicta that the 
contractors could not enforce such an agreement, but it sustained a 
demurrer denying any recovery of funds. 
4. Reliance Insurance Co. V. Alaska State Housing Authority, 
323 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Alas. 1971) -- The state recovered progress 
payments erroneously made to a bank instead of to the surety, which 
had assumed responsibility for work begun by an insolvent contractor. 
Again, this case stands for the proposition that a public entity may 
recover funds mistakenly paid to one who has not performed any service, 
5. Mackey v. McDonald, 504 S.W.2d 726 (Ark. 1974) -- This case 
was a dispute over the earmarking of federal revenue-sharing funds 
for a court's "contingency" account. No services were involved. The 
appropriation was sustained. 
6. Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers, 154 So.2d 859 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1963) -- A contractor who installed a counter in a court-
house in contravention of competitive bidding statutes was required 
to return the purchase price. He was allowed to remove the counter. 
7. Polk County v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 262 
F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1959) -- After paying life, health and accident 
insurance premiums for its employees for several years, the county 
became aware that such payments were apparently illegal under provi-
sions of the Georgia Constitution prohibiting employee benefits in 
excess of the statutorily prescribed salary. The county did not seek 
a full recovery of all premiums paid, but asked that it receive the 
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difference between the premiums it paid and the amount the insurance 
company paid out in benefits to county employees. The amount in-
volved was some $14,000. The Circuit Court, strictly applying what 
it believed to be Georgia law, allowed that recovery of money rec-
eived minus money paid out. That decision provoked an outraged 
dissent from Chief Justice Hutcheson. While conceding that his two 
fellow judges had decided the case according to their interpretation 
of Georgia law, he remarked: 
If, on the other hand, the majority ••• had 
held that the correct way to decide it as a case 
of first impression was to deny liability and 
permit the county to avoid payment for the insur-
ance, the benefits of which it had received, 
thus welshing on its agreement, I should content 
myself with saying that the decision was neither 
morally nor legally right, and, in sueport, should 
point to the uniform course of authority to the 
contrary • . • • 
Id. at 492. It is submitted that Judge Hutcheson's summary of the 
issues is equally applicable to this case. 
8. State v. McCarty, 279 P.2d 879 (Idaho 1955) -- The state 
recovered retirement benefit overpayments mistakenly made to judges 
under a misinterpretation of a statutory amendment. The excess was, 
at best, a gratuity to which the judges were not entitled, and for 
which they had rendered no additional service. 
9. National Fire Insurance Co. v. Butler, 152 N.W.2d 271 
(Iowa 1967) -- This case involved private parties, and is completely 
inapposite. 
10. State v. Rucker, 126 A.2d 846 (Md. 1956) -- In this case, a 
discharged employee had been reinstated and awarded back pay. The 
employer deducted the amount of unemployment compensation received 
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during the wrongful layoff from the back pay award. The state 
successfully reclaimed the amount of the unemployment compensation, 
because its retention would have unjustly enriched the employer. 
11. Dunne v. City of Fall River, 104 N.E.2d 157 (Mass. 1952) 
This was an ultra vires contract under which the city agreed to 
pay a promoter for inducing businesses to locate in that city. The 
city sought to recover funds paid prematurely, when businesses had 
promised to move to the area and subsequently failed to do so. 
Despite the ultra vires nature of the contract, the city neither 
sought nor received the return of any funds for any services that 
were actually performed. 
12. City of Saint Paul v. Dual Parking Meter Co., 39 N.W.2d 174 
(Minn. 1949) -- This was a competitive bidding statute violation 
involving the installation of parking meters, in which the city and 
installers operated in defiance of an injunction. The court speci-
fically found that the parties were not acting in good faith, but it 
still forced the city to return a certain amount of money to the 
contractor. The University cites dicta in a dissent. 
13. J.S. Love Co. v. Town of Carthage, 65 So.2d 568 (Miss. 
1953) -- In this case, the governmental entity illegally contracted 
with an agent to handle legal and technical problems involving the 
sale of bonds to finance a natural gas transmission system. It 
sought a recovery of the conunission paid the agent, minus the 
agent's expenses, and received that award. While this case is some-
what favorable to the University, there is an important factual 
difference in that the agent solicited and initiated the contract 
with the town, whereas here, Utah State solicited and initiated the 
business. 
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14. County of St. Francis v. Brookshire, 302 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 
1957) -- An attorney was forced to return money paid him by a county 
to defend several county employees in their individual capacity on 
the basis that the individuals, not the entity, had the responsi-
bility of making such payment. "[T]here were no services performed 
by defendant for the county." Id. at 5. 
15. City-Wide Asphalt Co. v. City of Independence, 546 S.W.2d 
493 (Mo.Ct. App. 1976) -- The court resolved this construction dis-
pute by finding that there was no valid contract. The company took 
nothing from the city, and vice versa. 
16. Fulk v. School District, 53 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1952) -- A 
school district, in an action later determined to be ultra vires, 
purchased a home for its superintendent of schools. The court 
ordered rescission of the conveyance, with the vendor returning the 
purchase price and the school district returning the property. 
However, the court considered the possibility that the property might 
have declined in value during the years it was held by the school 
district. To account for that possibility, it allowed the original 
vendor, at his option, to keep the money and force a sale of the 
property, with the proceeds from the sale to be turned over to the 
school district. The court held that if the sale generated insuffi-
cient money to compensate the school district for those funds wrong-
fully expended, the trustees would pay the difference. Court costs 
and interest on the money were also taxed to the trustees, as was 
the cost of any sale of the property. Appellants submit that this 
was an equitable and sensible approach to situations where restora-
tion of the status quo would not be possible due to the decline in 
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value of the things wrongfully purchased from the good-faith sup-
plier. 
17. Consentino v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 433 F.2d 1274 (8th 
Cir. 1970) -- This case involved the right of a citizen to bring a 
derivative antitrust action on behalf of the city. The court ob-
served in dicta that a citizen may have standing to bring an action 
to recover tax funds spent illegally, but could not bring a deriva-
tive antitrust action. 
18. Opinion of the Justices, 175 A.2d 396 (N.H. 1961) -- A 
state which had wrongfully overpaid mileage allowances to its legi-
slators was allowed to recover the excess. The justices suggested 
that they would more readily allow a recov~ry of this sort against 
public officials than against private individuals or corporations. 
19. Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood, 111 A.2d 899 (N.J. 
1955) A city's contract to buy a building was challenged as ultra 
vires on the basis that the city's plans for the structure would 
violate zoning ordinances. While the court in dicta mentioned rules 
concerning void contracts, it held that this one was valid because a 
municipality could change its own zoning ordinances. 
20. Shebell v. Strelechi, 249 A.2d 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1969) -- The state recovered money it had paid to the victim of 
an accident involving an uninsured motorist when the recipient of the 
funds subsequently was compensated by his employer. 
21. Rider v. Lenoir County, 78 S.E.2d 745 (N.C. 1953) -- This 
case did not involve the recovery of public funds in any way. Plain-
tiff had enjoined a construction project during a period of falling 
costs and the contract was subsequently relet at a substantially 
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lower price. He sought attorneys' fees fer having saved the tax-
payers the difference. He did not get them. 
22. Horner v. Chamber of Conunerce, 72 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. 1952) 
Plaintiff was awarded attorneys' fees for bringing an action that 
forced the Chamber of Conunerce to return money wrongfully paid to it 
by the city. The return was ordered because the Charr~er performed no 
services fer the appropriation. 
23. Town of Bennettsville v. Bledsoe, 84 S.E.2d 554 (S.C. 
1954) -- The defendant contractor acknowledged that he had been 
overpaid on a job. The town recovered the excess. 
24. Hauck v. Bull, 110 N.W.2d 506 (S.D. 1961) The South 
Dakota Supreme Court reversed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
in favor of a contractor, and held only that a taxpayer had standing 
to bring a claim that public money had been illegally expended on the 
contract. The case did not reach the merits of the issue. 
25. Carlson v. City of Faith, 67 N.W.2d 149 (S.D. 1954) 
Several city councilmen were required to return money they had been 
paid for goods and services sold to the city in contravention of a 
statute making it a misdemeanor for any city official to deal with 
the city in any way. The case held that forfeiture of all money 
received was an appropriate remedy to a criminal transaction. 
26. Crass v. Walls, 259 S.W.2d 670 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) 
Here, a small tcwn illegally contracted with a garbage disposal 
service owned by the mayor and his brother. As in the previous case, 
this specifically violated state law. The city recovered the one-
half of the money paid to the mayor, but his brother, who was inno-
cent of any wrongdoing, was allowed to keep his half. 
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27. State v. Continental Baking Co., 431 P .2d 993 (Wash. 1967) .. 
This case is precisely the sarr.e as State v. Rucker, supra. The state 
recovered unemployment compensation payments from an employer. 
28. Leuch v. Egelhoff, 38 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1949) -- Here, a 
sununary judgment for the defendant was reversed, and the plaintiff 
taxpayer was granted standing to sue. The merits of the case were 
not addressed. 
Appellants regret the need for the foregoing lengthy exposition 
of the University's authorities. However, Appellants cannot allow 
such gossamer to be elevated into "well-settled" law. As the Uni-
versity's authorities indicate, a total forfeiture such as the Uni-
versity seeks in this case had ~ been ordered absent criminal 
activity, proved or presumed. Furthermore, even partial forfeitures 
have been extremely rare. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a copy of the ~regoing Reply Brief 
of Appellants was hand delivered this ~~y of April, 1980 
to each of the following: 
Michael L. Deamer, Attorney General's Office, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
attorney for Utah State University of Agricul-
ture and Applied Science; 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Michael Heyrund, of 
Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, 12th 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, attorneys for 
certain third-party defendants; 
Melvin E. Leslie, George M. Mecham and David L. 
Wilkinson, 10 West Broadway #430, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, attorneys for Legislative Council; 
This is to also certify that a cop~ the foregoing Reply 
Brief of Appelants was mailed this /{' ~ d~y of April, 1980 to 
each of the following: 
Harold G. Christensen and L. Brent Stephens, of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 701 Continental 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, attor-
neys for Bosworth Sullivan; 
Darwin c. Hansen, 845 So. Main Street, Bountiful, 
Utah 84010, attorney for third-party defendant 
Donald A. Catron; 
Lyle W. Hillyard, 175 East 100 North, Logan, Utah 
84321; 
David R. Melton, of Karon, Morrison & Savikas, Ltd., 
5720 Sears Tower, 233 So. Wacker Drive, 
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